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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters of independent studies.
In Chapter 1, I develop a finite two-stage game model where consumers in
new export markets lack information about their own valuation for the quality of
a new product. The model is then used to examine firms’ quality choices. With
asymmetric information, the need to establish a quality reputation may not be
sufficient to induce firms to choose high quality. The likelihood that a firm
will choose to export a high-quality product rather than a lower-quality variant
increases with the number of experienced consumers. However, it decreases
with the number of competing firms. A policy of subsidising exporters can
encourage firms to select high quality and promote consumer experience, and
thus establish an independently viable high-quality export market. Nevertheless,
this will only work if the subsidy is conditional on quality choice. That is, the
administrative monitoring of quality is required. Beside, the government may
temporarily limit the number of competing firms. If consumers in new export
markets possess information about their own valuation, it may be possible to
promote the transition to a viable high-quality export market by competition
policy alone.
In Chapter 2, I employ a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with
two-sided asymmetric information to reconcile the theoretical results with ob-
servation. With two-sided asymmetric information, the probability of bargaining
failure is positive. The likelihood that the domestic and foreign firm will collude
increases with the probability of a high-type foreign firm but decreases with
the bargaining power and concentration level of the domestic firm. The small
number of private settlements indicates the inefficient outcome of the bargain-
ing game with asymmetric information rather than evidence of the antidumping
measure being less misused as a collusive tool.
In Chapter 3, I examine the behaviour of firms after the implementation of
an FTA by paying attention to the impacts of rules of origin on preferential
trade flows and economic activities within the FTA region. It is found that
a tightening of the rules of origin increases the volume of final goods import
from RoW but decreases the volume of intermediate goods and raw material
import from RoW, given the dominance of the final goods rules of origin effects.
However, if the intermediate goods rules of origin effects dominate, the volume
of intermediate goods import from RoW turns to increase, rather than decrease.
These imply that preferential trade flows and economic activities among the
member countries of an FTA may increase or decrease when the rules of origin
are tightened. The findings, inter alia, suggest that the product-specific rules
of origin that impose the restrictive rules to final goods but the loose rules
to intermediate goods are more efficient in promoting preferential trade and
economic activities within the region and also inducing investments from outside.
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Introduction
This thesis Essays on International Trade Policy consists of three indepen-
dent studies. These are (i) Quality Reputation and Export Promotion, (ii) Why
is it so difficult to settle a private agreement in an antidumping case? and (iii)
Do the Rules of Origin make a difference? Here, an introduction to each chapter
is addressed.
1 Quality Reputation and Export Promotion
With asymmetric information, the quality of a product is unobservable before
purchasing, firms have an incentive to sell low quality products at high-quality
prices. Shapiro (1983) shows that the returns of establishing a reputation are
a crucial role, inducing firms to choose high quality. Similarly, Allen (1984)
argues that firms have an incentive to offer a high-quality product although they
earn negative profits in order to signal consumers that their product is high
quality; the acquisition of reputation encourages firms to select high quality.
On the contrary, Shapiro (1982) finds that if consumers do not learn about
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the quality of a product, firms always choose to provide a minimum-quality
product. This is consistent with Donnefeld and Mayer’s findings (1987), firms
will choose to produce lower quality than socially optimal. The relationship
between reputation and quality choice is ambiguous.
This chapter is motivated by the following arguments: (i) Is the need to
establish a quality reputation sufficient to induce home firms to export a high-
quality product to new foreign markets?; (ii) Do home firms behave differently
in the different types of markets?; and (iii) If the need to establish a quality
reputation alone is insufficient, what are the roles of government to help to
establish the quality reputation of a product in target foreign markets? A finite
two-stage game model is developed to examine the quality choices of firms when
entering to the different types of foreign markets, which are (a) the new markets
where consumers lack information about their own valuation about the quality of
a product; (b) the mature markets where consumers know their own valuation;
and (c) the mixed markets where consist of consumers who know their own type
and consumers who do not, in order to answer the above questions.
It is found that the need to establish the quality reputation of a new product
and a firm itself is insufficient to persuade a home firm to upgrade the quality of
a product. Home firms are the most likely to export a high-quality product to
mature markets while they are the most likely to milk reputation by exporting
a low-quality product as a high-quality product in new markets. Consequently,
the likelihood of establishing a quality reputation increases with the number of
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experienced consumers.
However, if the probability that consumers in foreign markets assign a high
valuation on a high-quality product is sufficient large, the gains of establishing a
reputation are the largest in new markets. Hence home firms are the most likely
to export a high-quality product when entering to new markets. Consumers in
new markets cannot distinguish between a product is ill-match to their tastes
or a product is low quality then they will be deluded by a low-quality product.
These deluded consumers will not be interested in a high-quality product for the
future transactions anymore. As a result, home firms face a larger opportunity
loss if they milk their reputation in new markets than in mature markets where
consumers can distinguish between being ill-match and being low quality. This
can explains why the quality of an exported product is higher than a product
sold in domestic markets.
These results, especially the results in the case of new markets, may be
changed if the model is extended to be longer or infinite. With a long time
horizon, the expected payoff of establishing a quality reputation in new markets
increases. Home firms, thus, have more incentive to upgrade the quality of their
product. At the same time, consumers in new markets have other chances to
learn their true type after being deluded by a low-quality product resulting in a
decreasing in the opportunity losses from cheating. Hence, home firms have more
incentive to milk their reputation. The result are ambiguous; the likelihood of
exporting a high-quality product will either improve or fall depending on many
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factors such as the discount factor, the specification of market learning, the
speed of consumer learning.
Since the acquisition of reputation is not sufficient to induce home firms to
upgrade the quality of their product, the government intervention then is needed
to support firms to do that. The following policies are discussed: (i) export
promotion policy; (ii) export subsidies policy; and (iii) competition policy.
Since the likelihood of establishing a quality reputation increases with the
number of experienced consumers, the home government may help to improve
the incentive of home firms to do that by educating consumers in these markets
to know their own valuation about the quality of a product. Nevertheless, this
will be effective only if a high-quality product is introduced to inexperienced
consumers. For example, Thai government has run a campaign of Thai Jasmine
Rice in order to establish the quality reputation of Jasmine rice in the world
market. Not only the high quality of Jasmine rice has been provided for trailing,
how to cook rice properly, and Jasmine rice recipes have also been introduced
to consumers who are not familiar with rice before. Now Thai rice especially
Jasmine rice is considered as a high-quality rice in the world market and can
enjoy the premiums.
Moreover, the government can promote quality upgrading by giving home
firms export subsidies. When every units of a high-quality product that being
exported to foreign markets are subsidised, the gains (costs) of choosing the
choice of a high-quality product increase (decrease). However, export subsidies
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will be inefficient if the government cannot perfectly monitor the quality of a
subsidied product. Therefore, the government has to assure that the subsidies
are only given to products with high quality. This is consistent with Grossman
and Horn (1988). They suggest that subsidies do not alter incentives for choos-
ing high quality; in contrast, they may actually lower the average quality of a
product if subsidies are rewarded both reputable firms and hit-and-run firms
equally.
A relationship between the number of competing firms and the gains of estab-
lishing a quality reputation is found to be negative in the case of new markets;
this is consistent with Donnefeld and Mayer (1987), and Chiang and Masson
(1988). Hence, the government should limit the number of competing firms,
but just temporarily. Once the quality reputation of a product is established
and consumers in new markets become experienced in a product, the government
should permit free entry. Since the gains of establishing a quality reputation will
improve when the number of competing firms increases in the case of mature
market. When consumers in new export markets possess information about their
valuation, it may be possible to promote the transition to a viable high-quality
export market by competition policy alone.
To complete the study of this chapter, the welfare implications of estab-
lishing a quality reputation is made. Many studies argue that establishing the
quality reputation of a new product by quality upgrading is a desirable out-
come of exporting countries because the production of a high-quality product
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is often considered as a pre-condition for export success and, ultimately, the
economic development. However, the findings suggests differently; the choice of
a high-quality product may causes a loss in the welfare in exporting countries.
Establishing a quality reputation will improve the welfare in the home coun-
ties if, and only if, a fraction of consumers, whose tastes is a good match to a
product, is large enough.
2 Why is it so difficult to settle a private agree-
ment in an antidumping case ?
In recent decades, economists have sought to uncover how an antidumping policy
influences competition behaviour. The antidumping measure, which was orig-
inally designed to defend against unfair competition and remedy the injuries,
imparts obvious short-run advantage to domestic industries by raising import
costs or limiting import quantities; in some cases, this measure can also bene-
fit foreign industries. Prusa (1992), Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999), and
Zanardi (2004) all note that the antidumping policy generates an increase in
the set of collusive outcomes. Nowadays, the antidumping measure and its true
application have been widely questioned: whether this measure has been serving
the collusive purpose or for the defensive objection, as originally intended.
If the antidumping measure has been frequently used as a collusive device,
the number of private settlements should be high. However, according to actual
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data, only one-quarter of total antidumping cases result in a price-undertaking
agreement. Does the small number of private agreements support the argument
that the antidumping measure has been employed as a defensive tool? It is too
optimistic to make such a conclusion. At the same time, if domestic industries
have employed the antidumping measure to threaten and induce foreign indus-
tries to collude, what is the reason for the small number of private agreements?
Prusa (1999) shows that, theoretically, domestic and foreign firm always
collude, and agree to settle private agreements with certainty; however, his model
fails to explain why not all antidumping cases conclude with private settlements.
Zanardi (2004) introduces coordination costs and bargaining power to reconcile
Prusa’s results with actual data. His model suggests that the probability of
reaching a private agreement decreases with coordination costs and non-linearly
increases with bargaining power.
I have developed a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining model with two-sided
asymmetric information where the probability of an affirmative outcome1 is in-
fluenced by the type of the domestic and foreign firm and is considered as private
information for each party. This differs from Prusa and Zanardi, they assume
that the probability of an affirmative outcome is exogenously determined and
public information for both domestic and foreign firms. The model is then used
to examine the behaviour of firms and why domestic and foreign firms fail to
collude.
1Refers to an outcome in which antidumping duties are levied on products imported from
the dumpers’ country in response to a petitioning by domestic firms.
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The following results are found. Firstly, with two-sided asymmetric infor-
mation where the domestic and foreign firm are uncertain about the type of
each other, collusion will be reached with certainty if, and only if, the domestic
firm employs a pooling strategy and the probability of a low-type foreign firm is
significant small. Otherwise, collusion will be broken down with a positive prob-
ability. Secondly, the likelihood that the domestic and foreign firm will collude
increases with the probability of a high-type foreign firm and the probability
of a low-type domestic firm. However, it decreases with the bargaining power
and concentration level of the domestic firm. The lower the bargaining power of
the domestic firm is, the larger the probability that the foreign firm will collude
because the domestic firm is more likely to offer a larger share of the collusive
profits to the foreign firm. With the high concentration level, on the contrary,
the domestic and foreign firm are less likely to settle the private agreement since
the domestic firm tends to offer a smaller share of the collusive profits to the
foreign firm.
Thirdly, information asymmetry between the domestic and foreign firm is the
main cause of bargaining failure. The bargaining game is less likely to admit
efficient outcome under two-sided asymmetric information than one-sided asym-
metric information. This implies that the small number of price-undertaking
agreements is not evidence to support a decline in the use of the antidumping
measure as a collusive device. In contrast, it indicates the bargaining inefficiency
caused by asymmetric information. If domestic industries have often used the
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antidumping measure as a collusive device, should this behaviour be supported?
The welfare implications of antidumping outcomes suggest that the an-
tidumping measure may not improve welfare or oven deteriorate it. In order
to minimise the welfare losses of the antidumping measure, this measure must
be only used for the defensive purpose. Hence, the antidumping laws should be
harmonised. In other word, the same standard and practices for the antidump-
ing measure will be applied across countries. The government authorities have
to be objective when making the decision. Moreover, a lump sum payment for
the antidumping penalties from the dumpers should be used in steady of levying
the antidumping duties on products imported from the dumpers. This alterna-
tive approach causes neither a market distortion nor a negative impact on the
economy at large, while imposing the duties does.
3 Do the Rules of Origin make a difference?
During the past two decades, the number of free trade agreements has been
rapidly growing from around 110 in 1990 to 511 now. All member countries of
WTO, with the exception of Mongolia, are members of at least one FTA. The
booms in FTAs have sparked a discussion on the impacts of the FTA on trends
and patterns of trade. Generally, a country expected a considerable increase in
exports after joining the FTA because of a preferential treatment and market
enlargement; however, the expectation may never come true in the presence of
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rules of origin. Rules of Origin are the rules that determine whether or not
goods are eligible for preferential treatment under the FTA. Therefore, rules of
origin are a central market-access tool governing over preferential trade flows
and economic activities within the FTA region.
Krishna and Krueger (1995), Falvey and Reed (1998) and Ju and Krishna
(2005) all argue that the more restrictive rules of origin either decrease or in-
crease preferential trade flows within the FTA region, depending on the degree of
competition in the final goods and the intermediate goods sectors on which they
are applied. They are consistent with the empirical studies of Estervadeordal
and Suominen (2003) and Cadot, Estervadeordal and Akiko (2005), demon-
strating a negative relationship between the restrictiveness of rules of origin and
preferential trade flows among the FTA members. The policy makers, however,
seem to have different opinions. From their point of view, the more restrictive
rules of origin induce the regional firms to employ more regional inputs and in-
creasing preferential trade flows and economic activities within the FTA regions.
The restrictive rules of origin always generate the benefit outcomes to domestic
industries.
This chapter is motivated by the following arguments: Firstly, do the re-
strictive rules of origin promote preferential trade flows and economic activities
within the region? Secondly, how does the degree of restrictiveness of rules of
origin affect the behaviour of firms and the volume of goods import from the
Rest of the World? Then, what should the rules of origin be? I extend the
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model of Ju and Krishna (2005) by allowing a production of intermediate goods
and introducing the intermediate goods rules of origin to make the model close
to the real situation.
The results show that, with the dominance of final goods rules of origin
effects, the tightening rules of origin increases the volume of final goods import
from RoW but decreases the volume of intermediate goods and raw material
import from RoW for the homogeneous regime. This is consistent with Ju
and Krishna (2005) and the empirical studies by Estervadeordal and Suominen
(2003) and Cadot et al (2005). Nevertheless, for the heterogeneous regime, a
result is reversed.
If the intermediate goods rules of origin effects are dominant, the tightening
rules of origin increases the volume of final goods and intermediate goods import
from RoW, but decreases the volume of raw material import from RoW for the
homogeneous regime; it contradicts to Ju and Krishna (2005). On the contrary,
the result will be opposite for the heterogeneous regime. The rules of origin
impacts on preferential trade flows and economic activities are ambiguous, de-
pending on the degree of competition among the final goods, the intermediate
goods and the raw material sectors on which they are applied, whether the final
goods or the intermediate goods rules of origin effects dominate and whether
the upstream-input industries are comparative advantage or comparative disad-
vantage compared to RoW.
Accordingly, the product-specific rules that specify a specific criteria to each
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product and vary from product to product is preferable. The tight final goods
rule of origin and the loose intermediate goods rules of origin are more efficient to
promote preferential trade flows and economic activities within the FTA region.
When the final goods rules of origin are tight, the regional intermediate goods
and raw material are more required resulting in an increasing in the costs of
producing the final goods. At the same time, the loose intermediate goods rules
of origin relax an increasing in the cost of producing the intermediate goods and
then the final goods.
Since the preferential rules of origin are substantially different from agree-
ment to agreement and from country to country. Therefore, the proliferation of
overlapping FTAs causes the higher administrative cost and the higher burden
on manufacturers to comply with the rules of origin for many FTAs. In order
to achieve significant benefits in terms of lower administrative costs and relax
a burden on manufacturers, harmonisation of preferential rules of origin is in-
troduced. From my point of view, the main purpose of rules of origin is not
to be the simple rule; in contrast, they should be an efficient device to reach
the country’s objectives in establishing the FTA that varies from agreement to
agreement and from country to country. Hence, a variation across preferential
rules of origin regimes is preferable to a harmonised of preferential rules of origin.
The remainder of the thesis consists of three chapters of independent studies.
Chapter 1: Quality Reputation and Export Promotion, Chapter 2: Why is it so
12
difficult to settle a private agreement in an antidumping case? And Chapter 3:
Do the Rules of Origin make a difference? The conclusions of each chapter and
the entire thesis are addressed in the Conclusion.
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Chapter 1: Quality Reputation
and Export Promotion
Chutamas Bumrungsuk∗
Abstract
This paper develops a finite two-stage game model where consumers in new
export markets lack information about their own valuation for the quality of a
new product. The model is then used to examine firms’ quality choices. With
asymmetric information, the need to establish a quality reputation may not be
sufficient to induce firms to choose high quality. The likelihood that a firm will
choose to export a high-quality product rather than a lower-quality variant in-
creases with the number of experienced consumers. However, it decreases with
the number of competing firms. A policy of subsidising exporters can encourage
firms to select high quality and promote consumer experience, and thus establish
an independently viable high-quality export market. Nevertheless, this will only
work if the subsidy is conditional on quality choice. That is, the administrative
monitoring of quality is required. Beside, the government may limit the num-
ber of competing firms that exports to new foreign markets in order to increase
the incentive to export a high-quality product; this policy has to be temporary.
When consumers in new export markets possess information about their own
valuation, it may be possible to promote the transition to a viable high-quality
export market by competition policy alone.
JEL Classification: F13; C72
Keywords: quality reputation; subsidy policy; competition policy; asymmetric
information
∗Contact information: The Department of Economics, The University of Warwick, Coven-
try, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom; email c.bumrungsuk@warwick.ac.uk. I would like thank my
supervisor, Professor Carlo Perroni, for his valuable comments, patient guidance and his time.
All remaining errors are mine.
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1 Introduction
When the quality of a product is unobservable before purchasing, firms have
to decide whether providing a low-quality product with a high-quality price to
earn short-term gains or providing a high-quality product to establish a quality
reputation. Is the acquisition of reputation sufficient to induce firms to choose
the choice of a high-quality product? If not, how can one overcome this problem
and encourage firms to choose high quality ? Do firms behave differently in
new export markets with the different types of consumers? These are the main
focuses of this paper.
This paper examines the decision of home firms on quality choices by devel-
oping a finite two-stage game model where consumers in new foreign markets
lack information about their own valuation for the quality of a new product.
One finds that the acquisition of reputation is not sufficient to induce firms to
choose the choice of a high-quality product when information is asymmetric.
Therefore, the government intervention is needed.
Secondly, the likelihood that a firm will choose to export a high-quality prod-
uct rather than a low-quality variant increases with the number of experienced
consumers, who know their own valuation for the quality of a product. That is,
firms are the least likely to export a high-quality product to new markets where
consumers are inexperienced. However, firms may be the most likely to choose
the choice of high-quality product for exporting to new markets if the proba-
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bility that consumers in such markets assign a high valuation to a high-quality
product is sufficient large.
Thirdly, a negative relationship is found between the number of competing
firms and the gains from establishing a quality reputation in markets where
consumers are inexperienced. In other word, the larger number of competing
firms causes home firms to be less likely to export a high-quality product to
new markets. This is consistent with Donnefeld and Mayer (1987) and Chiang
and Masson (1988). Conversely, a positive relationship is found in the case of
mature markets. The larger number of competing firms increases the likelihood
of exporting a high-quality product to mature markets where consumers have
experience about their own valuation and the quality of a product.
Accordingly, the home government should increase the number of experienced
consumers in target foreign markets and decrease the number of competing firms
in order to improve the gains from establishing a quality reputation. With a
high-quality product, consumers in foreign markets not only learn whether such
a product is a good match but they also have information about a high-quality
product. With a low-quality product, however, consumers may be deluded about
their tastes. To open up a foreign market of a new product, the home government
has to educate consumers in such market by providing them an experienced on
a high-quality product.
Beside educating consumers in new foreign markets, the home government
can increase the firms’ expected payoff from exporting a high-quality product by
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limiting the number of exporting firms. Nevertheless, this policy should not be
permanent. Once consumers in target foreign markets have experienced about a
product and know their own valuation, competition can induce both incumbent
firms and new entrants to choose the choice of a high-quality product. Moreover,
the government can motivate home firms to export a high-quality product by a
policy of subsidising a high-quality product. For effective implementation, the
government has to closely monitor the quality of an exported product that being
subsidised.
Last but not least, a welfare analysis of establishing a quality reputation is
made. Establishing a quality reputation by upgrading the quality of a product
will lead to a welfare gain or loss depending on a fraction of consumers whose
tastes match to a home product. If the fraction is large enough, the choice of a
high-quality products will improve the welfare in the home country.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews related litera-
ture about the relationship between reputation and firms’ quality choices. In
Section 3, a basic model of a finite two-stage game, where consumers in new
markets lack information about their valuation for the quality of a new product,
is introduced to examine firms’ quality choices. Section 4 shows what the gov-
ernment should do to induce firms to upgrade the quality of their products. A
discussion on export promotion policy, export subsidies policy and competition
policy is made in this section. In Section 5, a welfare analysis of establishing a
quality reputation is provided. Finally, the conclusion is presented in Section 6.
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2 Literature Review
When the product quality is unobservable or unidentifiable, a consumer’s ex-
pectation of the product quality is according to an average quality sold in the
market. With asymmetric information, firms will choose to produce below the
average quality level in order to earn short-term gains. Shapiro (1982) analyses
how a profit-maximising firm chooses the quality of products when the quality is
unobservable before purchasing. With a static model, he finds that a producer
only provides a minimum-quality product to the market if prices are determined
by the average quality in the market. Moreover, with a dynamic model, given
that consumers do not learn about the product quality of each individual firm
over time, the market is overrun by minimum-quality products.
Shapiro (1983) studies the relationship between reputation and the behaviour
of firms under prefect competitive environment. Since products are difficult to
observe before purchasing, then consumers may plausibly use the quality of
products produced by a firm in the past as an indicator of present or future
quality. His findings show that the premium, which is the returns from build-
ing up the reputation of firms, plays a crucial role in inducing firms to keep
their reputation high by offering a high-quality product. Moreover, if consumers
learning process about the quality of a product is slow, the high premium will
be required to encourage firms to establish his reputation.
According to Allen (1984), consumers in his model reassure themselves about
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a high-quality product of each firm by verifying the price charged and the quan-
tity produced. These consumers will refuse to buy any products from firms that
offer a lower price because they reasonably believe that such products are low
quality. Hence, firms may choose to suffer losses by offering a high-quality prod-
uct at the outset in order to build their quality reputation and subsequently
earn profits afterward. That is, building up a reputation encourages firms to
select high quality.
When consumers update their belief about firms according to their perfor-
mance, firms will harm their reputation with a poor performance, but they will
improve their reputation with a good performance. Tadelis (1999) argues that
the reputation of firms fluctuates. With a good news learning environment,
low-reputation firms will offer a high-quality product to build their own repu-
tation or buy the reputation from reputable firms. On the other hand, with a
bad news learning environment, the high-reputation firms have an incentive to
maintain a high-quality level in order to keep their reputation high, as suggested
by Diamond (1989).
Issac (2003) assumes that consumers have a slow learning process about the
quality of a product and they learn about it by observing an ex-post outcome.
His results show that, if firms learn about their own quality at the same rate as
consumers, sufficiently bad luck can induce firms to stop trading in the markets.
On the contrary, if firms know that the quality of their products is high, they
will trade and obtain more gains from continuing trade because their reputation
19
is relatively more likely to improve.
Boardyand and Veh (2010) examines how the reputation of firms affects
investment incentives, given that the quality of a product is persistent and de-
termined by the past investment. They find that reputational incentives are
determined by the specification of market learning. With perfect good news
signals, which indicate high quality, the reputational payoff decreases in the
reputation of firms. Accordingly, low-reputation firms have more investment
incentives to produce a high-quality product. In contrast, with perfect bad
news signals, which indicate low quality, the reputation payoff increases in the
reputation of firms. Hence, high-reputation firms are more likely to produce a
high-quality product.
Across all imperfect learning processes with Brownian and Poisson signals,
If firms with a low reputation are believed to invest for high quality, their rep-
utation increases and reputational returns are high. Therefore, a high-quality
product is sustainable when markets believe that the quality of a product is
low. Conversely, when markets believe that the product’s quality is high, a
high-quality product is not sustainable as a result of the low reputational re-
turns.
When a new domestic product is introduced to the foreign market, foreign
consumers, who know nothing about such a product except the country of origin,
will identify a product by country, not by firm and learn about the quality
through consumption. If a domestic firm exports a high-quality product to the
20
foreign market, a reputation is then built not only for the firm itself but also for
the country as a whole. In other word, all exporting products from the same
country of origin enjoy the same reputation. For this reason, the government
intervention may be needed. Mayer (1984) suggests that the government should
subsidise export firms to encourage them to establish the reputation of a country
by exporting a high-quality product. However, Grossman and Horn (1988) find
that subsidies may lower the average quality of a product if they reward both
reputable and hit-and-run firms equally.
Should the government limit the number of firms to increase the quality
of a product from its country? The relationship between the number of firms
and the quality level is unclear. Regarding to Donnefeld and Mayer (1987),
they develop a general equilibrium setting with an endogenous determining the
number of firms. Their results suggest that the government should decrease the
number of firms and control the size of firms in order to upgrade the quality of
a product and the efficiency of firms; without intervention, firms produce lower
quantities and lower quality than socially optimal.
Chiang and Masson (1988) employ a partial equilibrium model, with the
endogenous determining the number of firms and find the inverse relationship
between the number of firms and the quality level. Firms raise the quality
of a product when the number of firms falls. This finding is consistent with
Donnenfeld and Mayer (1987). In contrast, Horner (2002) argues that compe-
tition induces reputable firms to maintain their quality at high level. Without
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competition, when consumers cannot perfectly monitor the quality of a prod-
uct, firms are less likely to keep their product quality high. Competition, on the
other hand, endogenously generates outside options for disappointed consumers.
Consumers can leave the firms whenever they do not satisfy with the quality of
a product. Therefore, a reputation is valuable.
Dana and Fong (2008) finds that firms in an oligopoly market are able to
more easily maintain their reputation for a high-quality experience product than
firms in a competitive market or a monopolist. This finding is consistent with
empirical evidence by McMaster (1995) and Domberger and Sherr (1989). On
the one hand, McMaster (1995) argues that introducing competitive bidding
for some health services in the UK lowers their quality. On the other hand,
Domberger and Sherr (1989) show that the British government’s decision to lib-
eralise the conveyancing monopoly in 1984 improves the quality of conveyancing
services in England and Wales.
3 The Finite Two-Stage Model
Assume competitive n home sellers export a homogeneous product to the foreign
market, but they can choose between a high- or low-quality variant of it. The
seller incurs a cost cH or cL < cH in exporting a high- or low-quality product,
respectively. There is a large population of risk-neutral buyers who are either
type A, assigning a valuation of vH on a unit of high-quality product (qH) and a
22
valuation of vL < vH on a unit of low-quality product (qL), or type B, assigning
a valuation vL on both variants. Assuming that a fraction θ of the buyers are
type A and the following inequality equation holds:
vH − cH ≡ piH > vL − cL ≡ piL > θvH + (1− θ)vL − cH ≡ p˜i > 0
The inexperienced buyer does not know his own type. In other word, he
does not know whether a product exported by the seller is a good match to his
subjective tastes. However, he can learn about this through his consumption.
The buyer is assumed to place no weight on future payoffs, or δB = 0. This
implies that the buyer does not incorporate the experimental effect on future
payoff into his valuation for each period. At the same time, the seller is assumed
to discount her future payoff according to a positive factor, that is, δS > 0.
This model considers a short-run game where players are active in the mar-
ket for two periods. During the first period, a potential buyer and seller are
randomly assigned to each other. The seller presents a price and a quality offer
to the buyer. That is, she offers a high-quality product, qH , with price pH or a
low-quality product, qL, with price pL. The buyer decides to either accept offer
or reject them both; if he rejects the offer, no transaction takes place and there
is zero payoff to both the seller and buyer in this period. However, if the buyer
accepts the offer, his payoff is realised after consuming and depending on his
own type and product quality.
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Given that the buyer accepts the offer of a high-quality product, the seller
can choose to outsource either a high-quality product or a low-quality product
from its outsourcing manufacturers because the product quality is unobservable
at the time of purchase. Hence, the seller decides whether to cheat or be honest.
If the seller cheats by exporting a low-quality product to her buyer, she will
get a short-run gain. In contrast, if the seller is honest, she can establish her
reputation in the market as well as the buyer can realise his own type.
At the beginning of the second period, the buyer has two choices. Firstly,
participating in a lottery draw that randomly assigns him to the seller, or sec-
ondly, attempting to buy again from the same seller whom he purchased from
in the first period. Assume that the separation of buyer and seller occurs, with
probability ω, with the buyer being randomly assigned to the seller. Therefore,
a new transaction with the first-period seller takes place with probability 1−ω,
where ω > piL/piH .
In the second period, the seller again presents a combination of price and
quality offer; however, in this round, the quality is assumed to be observable
and enforceable. Consequently, the seller certainly exports the promised quality
to her buyer. If the buyer experiences vH in the first round, he will choose the
second choice, that is, trying to buy again from the same seller. At the same
time, if the buyer experiences vL, he will employ the first choice.
Now the behaviour of home sellers in the different types of foreign markets
is examined. The home seller decides whether to establish her reputation in
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the foreign market depending on the size of reputation gains. The behaviour of
home sellers when enter to new markets, mature markets and mixed market are
presented in the rest of this section.
The New Markets
In new markets where all buyers have no experience of the product introduced
by the home seller, the buyer holds an initial belief β0A = θ. That is, the
buyer believes with probability θ that the product bough from the seller is a
good match to his subjective tastes. Accordingly, the expected valuation to the
buyer, when the seller delivers a high-quality product in the first period, is:
v˜ = θvH + (1− θ)vL
The buyer will never accept the offer from the seller if the product price exceeds
his expected valuation; therefore, it is optimal for charging a price that exactly
equals the expected valuation of the buyer. In other word, pH = v˜ for a high-
quality product and pL = vL for a low-quality product.
If the seller offers and exports a high-quality product to new markets, her
payoff in the first period is:
p˜i = v˜ − cH
On the contrary, if the seller promises a high-quality product but exports a
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low-quality product instead, her payoff from cheating is:
p˜iD = v˜ − cL > p˜i
Now, the seller who offers a high-quality product faces the temptation to cheat,
which equals p˜iD − p˜i, or:
Ω ≡ cH − cL
When the seller exports a high-quality product as promised, the type A buyer
will experience vH and will update his belief to β
1
A = 1. This type A buyer will
be willing to pay up to pH = vH for a high-quality product and try to buy again
from the same seller in the second period. Thus, given a strategy adopted by the
buyer and a probability of separation, the type A buyer will buy again from the
seller, who exported a high-quality product in the first period, with probability
ηA ≡ (1−ω) + ωn . On the other hand, the type B buyer will experience vL. This
type B buyer will then update his belief to β1B = 1 and will purchase only a low-
quality product at pL = vL in the second period. According to the assumptions,
the buyer will participate in lottery draw if he experiences vL, a transaction in
the second period will take place with the same seller in the first period with
probability ηB ≡ 1n .
Therefore, the expected payoff in the second period to the seller, who keeps
26
her promise by exporting a high-quality product in the first period, is:
θηApiH + (1− θ)ηBpiL
If the seller breaks her promise by exporting a low-quality product instead, the
buyer will update his belief to β1A = 0, regardless of what true type he is. The
buyer will then be believed that he is the type B buyer whose subjective tastes
do not match to a product bough from the seller in the first period. The expected
payoff to the seller, who cheats in the first period, is:
1
n
piL
Offering and exporting a high-quality product is the best response to the
seller when enters into new markets, if the expected payoff from exporting a
high-quality product is not less than the expected payoff from deviation. That
is:
p˜i + δS [θηApiH + (1− θ)ηBpiL] ≥ p˜iD + δS
(
1
n
)
piL
A condition for the seller to establish her reputation in new markets can be
stated as:
Ω ≤ δSθ (ηApiH − ηBpiL) ≡ Ω∗1 (1)
The seller will choose to export a high-quality product to new markets, where
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all buyers are inexperienced in her product, in the first period to establish her
reputation, if the reputation gains are larger than the short-run benefits from
cheating.
If the seller offers to deliver a low-quality product with price pL = vL and
the buyer accepts it, the buyer will experience vL and learn nothing about his
own type, that is, β1A = θ. Thus, the buyer, in the second period, will be willing
to pay for a high-quality product at price p˜ = v˜, whereas the seller will not offer
a high-quality product at that price because of piL > p˜i. The expected payoff to
the seller who offers a low-quality product in the first period is:
piL + δ
S
(
1
n
)
piL
The seller will not choose to offer a low-quality product rather than a high-
quality one in the first round, if the following condition holds:
p˜i + δS [θηApiH + (1− θ)ηBpiL] ≥ piL − δS
(
1
n
)
piL
or:
Ω ≤ δSθ (ηApiH − ηBpiL) + (v˜ − vL) ≡ Ω∗2 (2)
Due to the fact that (v˜ − vL) > 0, then Ω∗1 < Ω∗2. If condition (1) is satisfied,
condition (2) is also satisfied. In other words, the seller always chooses to estab-
lish her reputation in new markets. On the contrary, when condition (2) holds,
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it does not guarantee that condition (1) will hold. If condition (1) is violated,
the seller’s promise to export a high-quality product is incredible. The buyer
never accepts the offer on a high-quality product in the first period, since he
knows that the seller always breaks promise by exporting a low-quality product.
Consequently, the seller always chooses to export a low-quality product to the
buyer in both period. If the reputation gains are not large enough, the seller
is less likely to export a high-quality product to settle her reputation in new
markets.
Proposition 1 If a condition Ω ≤ Ω∗1 holds, the seller will export a high-
quality product in order to establish a quality reputation in new markets. How-
ever, if Ω > Ω∗1, the seller will only export a low-quality product to new markets.
This implies that the likelihood of establishing a quality reputation in new
markets increases with the number of the type A buyers. With a larger proba-
bility of a product being matched to consumers’ tastes, the home firms are more
likely to export a high-quality product to new markets. Consumers in new mar-
kets may be deluded about their true tastes if the home firms sell a low-quality
product as a high-quality product. As a result, these consumers will not be
interested in purchasing a high-quality product again even though a product is
a good match to their tastes.
For example, if a Thai firm would like to bring Pad-Thai frozen meal to
the Western markets, where consumers are not familiar with Thai food, the
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firm must provide a high-quality Pad-Thai frozen meal to consumers in these
markets. If the firm provides a low-quality product, consumers will be misun-
derstood that Pad-Thai frozen meal is ill-matched to their tastes and Pad-Thai
frozen meal may fail in the Western market. A bad first impression due to a
low-quality product may cause a product failure in new markets. Accordingly,
the government should have a policy to support firms to export a high-quality
product to new markets because other firms, who sell the same product from
the same country, will be also benefits from establishing a quality reputation of
a pioneering firm. The policy discussion is made in the next section.
If the model is extended to be a longer or an infinite game, the results may
be changed because the buyer has the opportunity to learn about his true type
after being deluded by a low-quality product. On the one hand, with a long
time horizon, the seller may be more likely to export a high-quality product
rather than a low-quality one at the beginning as a consequence of the larger
gains from establishing the quality reputation of a product. On the other hand,
with a possibility of consumer learning process, the seller may be more likely
to cheat by exporting a low-quality product as a high-quality variant since she
has a second chance to introduce a high-quality product to the buyer whom is
deluded.
Accordingly, with a long time horizon and a possibility of consumer learning,
the seller may have either more or less incentive to choose high quality for
establishing her reputation in new markets depending on many factors such as
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the discount factor, the specification of market learning, or the speed of consumer
learning. Regarding to Shapiro (1983), with infrequent sale of products, long lags
in detection of quality, slow updating of reputations, or difficulty in detecting
quality attribution, the premiums for a high-quality product must be larger in
order to compensate for the investment in reputation. This can be interpreted
that firms are less likely to choose the choice of a high-quality product if there
is a small probability of the firm being chosen or there is a slow updating of
reputations.
Tadelis (1999) suggests that, with a good news learning, low-reputation firms
will have more incentives to offer a high-quality product to build their reputation.
Conversely, Boardyand and Veh (2010) argue that, with Brownian and Poisson
learning process, if consumers believe that the quality of a product is low, low-
reputation firms are more likely to upgrade the quality of their product. These
studies indicate that the specification of market learning plays a crucial role in
determining whether firms choose the choice of a high-quality product.
The Mature Markets
When the home seller enters into mature markets where all buyers know their
own type and have experience about a product, she knows that the type A buyer
prefers to purchase a high-quality product at price pH = vH , whereas the type
B buyer prefers to purchase a low-quality product at price pL = vL. Hence,
in the first period, the home seller will offer either a high-quality product or
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a low-quality product to her buyer depending on the type of the buyer being
assigned to her. Now let focus on the case of the type A buyer.
In the first period, the seller offers a high-quality product at price pH = vH
and this offer is accepted by the type A buyer. If the seller cheats by exporting
a low-quality product as a high-quality product, the buyer will suddenly realise
after consuming that he is cheated by the seller. Accordingly, in the second
period, this type A buyer will still prefer to purchase a high-quality product at
price pH = vH but he will participate in a lottery draw rather than attempting
to buy again from the same seller. In contrast, if the seller chooses to be honest,
the buyer will try to buy a high-quality product again from her in the second
period.
As far as the following equation holds, the seller will export a high-quality
product to establish a quality reputation in mature markets:
(vH − cH) + δSηApiH ≥ (vH − cL) + δSηBpiH
or:
Ω ≤ δS (ηA − ηB) piH ≡ Ω∗3 (3)
The expected payoff from establishing a quality reputation in these markets is
generally higher than in new markets, except θ > θ∗ ≡
[
ηApiH−ηBpiH
ηApiH−ηBpiL
]
. An in-
crease in the probability of the type A buyer causes the more opportunity losses
from cheating in new markets because the true type A buyers will never be inter-
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ested in purchasing a high-quality product with a high price any more. Hence,
if the probability that the buyer in the new market is type A is significant large,
the seller is more likely to export a high-quality product when enters to new
markets than mature markets.
Proposition 2 The seller is more likely to export a high-quality product
in order to establish a quality reputation when enters into new markets than
mature markets if the probability that the buyer assigns a high valuation to a
high-quality product is sufficient large. That is, θ > θ∗ ≡
[
ηApiH−ηBpiH
ηApiH−ηBpiL
]
.
While consumers in mature markets can distinguish between a product is low
quality and it is ill-match for their tastes, consumers in new markets cannot.
Therefore, if the seller chooses the short-run gains from exporting a low-quality
product as a high-quality product to new markets, this choice not only ruins
her own quality reputation, it also condemns the quality reputation of other
sellers who sell the same product from the same country. This explains why the
government is more concerned with the quality of an exported product than a
product sold in its own market. For example, Chinese government has tightened
export regulations to comply with the international standard and has offered
firms with a good record more preferential policy in order to encourage them to
export a high-quality product to the world market.
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The Mixed Markets
Now consider the case that the seller enters into the markets where consist
of experienced and inexperienced consumers. Assuming that the buyer is a
member of the experienced consumers, who have information about their own
valuation for the quality of a product, with probability λ and this probability is
independent of the probability that the buyer is type A.
In the first period, the probability that the seller will be randomly assigned
to the buyer, who will prefer to purchase a high-type quality at price pH = vH ,
is λθ. In other word, only the experienced type A buyer will be willing to buy
a high-quality product at high price. On the contrary, with probability 1 − λ,
the seller will be assigned to the inexperienced buyer, who will accept the offer
of a high-quality product if, and only if, the price does not exceed his expected
valuation, or pH = v˜. If the seller keeps a promise by exporting a high-quality
product to the buyer, the type A buyer will buy a high-quality product at price
pH = vH from her again in the second period with probability ηA, whereas the
type B buyer will buy a low-quality product at price pL = vL from her with
probability ηB. Accordingly, the expected payoff to the seller, who exports a
high-quality product can be shown as:
λθpiH + (1− λ)pi + δS [ηAθpiH + ηB(1− θ)piL]
If the seller chooses the short-run gains from exporting a low-quality product
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as a high-quality product, the experienced buyers will realise that the buyer
cheats on him while the inexperienced buyer will not. Therefore, the experienced
type A buyer will participate in a lottery draw and buy a high-quality product,
whereas the inexperienced buyer will buy a low-quality product because he is
believed that he is the type B. The expected payoff to the seller, who exports a
low-quality product as a high-quality product, is equal to:
λθ (vH − cL) + (1− λ) (v˜H − cL) + δS [ηBλθpiH + ηB(1− λ)piL]
As long as the expected payoff from establishing a quality reputation is
greater than the expected payoff from cheating, the seller will choose to establish
her reputation. In other word, the seller will export a high-quality product to
mixed markets when the following condition holds:
Ω <
δSθ
1− λ+ λθ [ηApiH − ηBpiL − ηBλ (piH − piL)] ≡ Ω
∗
4 (4)
The seller is the most likely to export a high-quality product when she enters
into mature markets as a result of the largest gains in this type of market. That
is, Ω∗3 > Ω
∗
4 > Ω
∗
1. Nevertheless, if a probability of a product being matched to
buyers’ tastes is significant large, or θ > θ∗ ≡
[
ηApiH−ηBpiH
ηApiH−ηBpiL
]
, the result will be
changed. The incentives to export a high-quality product in new markets is the
largest.
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These indicate that the seller who chooses the short-run gains from cheating
may change to enjoy the long-run gains from establishing a quality reputation
when experienced buyers are present in markets. According to equation 4, an
increase in a probability of experienced buyers raises the expected payoff from
exporting a high-quality product. The effects of a probability of experienced
buyers on the reputation gains can be described as:
∂Ω∗4
∂λ
=
[
δSθ
(1− λ+ λθ)2
]
(ηA − ηB)piH − θ (ηApiH − ηBpiL) (5)
As far as θ <
[
ηApiH−ηBpiH
ηApiH−ηBpiL
]
, the gains from establishing a quality reputation
increases with the number of experienced buyers, or
∂Ω∗4
∂λ
> 0. Thus, the repu-
tation gains in mature markets are larger than in mixed markets and the rep-
utation gains in mixed markets are larger than in new markets. In contrast,
if θ >
[
ηApiH−ηBpiH
ηApiH−ηBpiL
]
, the result will be reversed. As the number of experienced
buyers increases, the reputations gains are declined. The seller is the most likely
to establish a quality reputation when she enters into new markets, if the prob-
ability of the type A buyer is sufficient large.
Proposition 3 The likelihood that the seller will choose to export a high-
quality product to establish a quality reputation increases with the number of
experienced buyers, if a condition θ <
[
ηApiH−ηBpiH
ηApiH−ηBpiL
]
holds. However, it decreases
with the number of experienced buyers, if otherwise.
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4 Policy Discussion
As shown in section 3, in the presence of asymmetric information, the need
to establish a quality reputation may be insufficient to induce firms to choose
the choice of a high-quality product. Therefore, the government intervention is
needed to encourage firms to establish a quality reputation. Basically, the gov-
ernment has to improve the incentive of firms to export a high-quality product
and reduce the cost of exporting it. Export promotion policy, Export subsidising
policy and Competition policy are discussed as follows.
Export Promotion Policy
Regarding to equation 5, the gains from establishing a quality reputation in-
creases with the number of experienced consumers, a private firm which is not
interested in establishing a quality reputation in new markets may change to ex-
port a high-quality product when experienced consumers are present in market.
Accordingly, the government could increase the incentive of firms by raising the
number of experienced consumers in new export markets. A free product trail is
a simple and straightforward approach for introducing a product to new export
markets and informing new consumers about the quality of a product.
As already discussed, introducing a low-quality product to consumers in new
market deludes inexperienced consumers into believing that a product is ill-
matched to their subjective tastes. Hence, if firms would like to establish the
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quality reputation of an introduced product, they must introduce a high-quality
product, not a low-quality variant. However, firms have less incentive to do that
because of a free rider problem. The government should assume responsibility
for doing so instead of private firms.
For example, the Thai government has run a campaign Thai Jasmine Rice1
to introduce Thai Jasmine rice to new export markets where consumers are not
familiar with rice. This campaign gives consumers an experience based on the
real taste, texture and flavour of a high-quality Thai Jasmine rice. A high-
quality Jasmine rice gives a good first impression to consumers in new markets
and is a key factor in successful opening and establishing a quality reputation
of Jasmine rice in international markets, especially the Chinese and Hong Kong
market.
When a high-quality product is provided and trailed, consumers in new mar-
kets become experienced ones and can distinguish between a high-quality prod-
uct and a low-quality variant. Consequently, consumers, whose tastes match to
a product introduced by the government, are willing to pay a premium price for
a high-quality product. The incentive of choosing a high-quality product will be
improved from this policy and then the quality reputation of a new product can
be settled.
1Or Kao Hom Mali: a long-grain variety of rice that has a nutty aroma, a subtle pandan-like
flavor and originally from Thailand only.
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Export Subsidies Policy
If a firm exports a low-quality product as a high-quality one to new markets,
where consumers lacks information about their own valuation for the quality
of a product, none of consumers will accept the offer of a high-quality product
at a premium price in the future. As a result, the new entry firms may lose
opportunities to establish a quality reputation in such markets although they
will provide a high-quality product. This implication is consistent with Mayer
(1984), the poor performance of one firm ruins the quality reputation not only
for itself but also for the country. The experience with Toyota also determines
the quality of other Japanese brands, for instance.
The consumers’ first impression of a product is a key factor to determine the
success or failure of a product in new markets. The performance of pioneering
firms is more important; the government, hence, has to motivate firms to ex-
port a high-quality product rather than a low-quality variant into new markets.
Subsidising a high-quality product is a direct and efficient instrument to reduce
the cost of establishing a quality reputation.
Assume that the government subsidises sH to every unit of a high-quality
product that firms export to new markets. The expected payoff to home firms
when export a high-quality product can be written as:
(v˜ − cH + sH) + δs [ηAθ(piH + sH) + ηB(1− θ)piL]
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With a perfect monitoring, if firms do not export a high-quality product, they
will not be subsidised by the government. Thus, the gains from exporting a
high-quality product increases whereas the gains from cheating do not change.
A condition for firms to establish a quality reputation when the government
subsidises to a high-quality product is:
Ω ≤ sH(1 + δSθηA) + δsθ [ηApiH − ηBpiL] ≡ Ω∗SH (6)
A comparison between Ω∗1 and Ω
∗
SH
indicates that the gains from exporting a
high-quality product to new markets with export subsidies are greater than
the gains without subsidies. Therefore, a policy of subsidising a high-quality
product can motivate firms to upgrade the quality of their export product in
new markets.
If the government cannot perfectly monitor the quality of an export product,
this policy may inefficiently induce firms to upgrade the quality of their product.
Beside an increasing in the gains from exporting a high-quality product, subsidies
also raise the short-run gains from cheating. Hence, a condition for firms to
establish a quality reputation when the government subsidises to a high-quality
product but it cannot perfectly monitoring can be stated as:
Ω ≤ sHδSθηA + δsθ [ηApiH − ηBpiL] ≡ Ω∗s´H (7)
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The gains from exporting a high-quality product when the government sub-
sidises to a high-quality product are always greater than the gains when the
government does not. Nevertheless, without a perfect monitoring, export sub-
sidies provide firms the less incentive to export a high-quality product than
subsidies with a perfect monitoring. Accordingly, the government has to closely
monitor the quality of a subsidised product to ensure that such product is a
high-quality product.
This is consistent with Grossman and Horn (1988). They argue that sub-
sidies, which reward both reputable and hit-and-run firms equally, do not offer
an incentive for choosing high quality. In fact, subsidies may lower the average
quality of a product being exported to new markets. Hence, the administra-
tive monitoring of quality should be implemented, together with subsidies to
ensure that firms will not cheat by exporting a low-quality product rather than
a high-quality variant.
With respect to Mayer (1984), as long as the product familiarisation pro-
cess works through the consumption of an export product, the subsidisation
of exports for market cultivation is the first-best policy.2 In accordance with
Mayer’s study, the quality of a product is not a necessary condition for receiving
the export subsidies. This contradicts the findings of the finite two-stage game
model.
2If inexperienced consumers are cultivated through other activities such as advertising,
then subsidisation of these activities rather than exporting would be the first-best policy.
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Competition Policy
The competition impacts on the quality of a product is ambiguous. According to
Donnefeld and Mayer (1987) and Chiang and Masson (1988), firms will upgrade
the quality of their product when the number of firms falls. Therefore, the
government should control the number of firms. On the contrary, Horner (2002)
argues that a competition induces firms to maintain the quality of their product
at a high level. These indicate that a competition policy plays a crucial role to
determine product quality. Whether the government should decrease or increase
the number of competing firms?
The number of firms impacts on the gains from exporting a high-quality
product to new markets can be shown as:
∂Ω∗1
∂n
= −
[
ωpiH − piL
n2
]
θδS
Accordingly, firms are more likely to export a high-quality product rather than a
low-quality variant when the number of firms falls, given that a condition ω > piL
piH
holds.3 With the large number of firms and the existence of a separation of buyer
and seller, firms face a small probability that they will be chosen again in the
3In contrast, if ω < piLpiH , the likelihood that a firm chooses to export a high-quality product
to new markets increases with the number of firms, since:
∂Ω∗1
∂ω
= −
(
n− 1
n
)
θδSpiH
When consumers are more loyal to firms that export a high-quality product, then firms have
more incentives to establish a quality reputation.
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next transaction so the expected payoff from establishing a quality reputation
falls. This gives a similar result to Donnefeld and Mayer (1987) and Chiang and
Masson (1988) and is consistent with empirical findings of MacMaster (1995)
and Crespi and Marette (2006).4
The number of firms will have different effects on the reputation gains if firms
enter into mature markets. That is:
∂Ω∗3
∂n
=
[
piH − ωpiH
n2
]
θδS
The relationship between the number of firms and the expected payoff from ex-
porting a high-quality product is positive in mature markets. Firms are more
likely to choose a high-quality product to establish their reputation in order to
keep their consumers for the future transactions.5 The larger the number of
firms is, the more pressure on firms to choose a high-quality product because
firms face the larger probability of losing their future profits when cheating.
This is consistent with Horner (2002) and the empirical evidences provided by
4MacMaster (1995) finds empirical evidence that allowing competitive bidding for some
health services in the UK resulted in a lower quality of these services. Moreover, Crespi and
Marette (2006) presents empirical evidences of a positive relationship between product quality
and market concentration.
5If firms choose the short-run gains from cheating, they will lose out on profit piH with
probability
[
(1−ω)(n−1)
n
]
. Denote ϕ ≡ (ηA − ηB) =
[
(1−ω)(n−1)
n
]
, then:
∂ϕ
∂n
=
1− ω
n2
The probability that firms will lose their opportunities to earn a larger profit, piH , in the next
transaction when exporting a low-quality product increases with the number of competing
firms.
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Mazzaeo (2003) and Cohen and Mazzeo (2004).6
Proposition 4 The likelihood that a firm will choose to establish a quality
reputation by exporting a high-quality product decreases with the number of
competing firms in new markets, given a separation of buyer and seller ω > piL
piH
.
However, it increases with the number of competing firms in mature markets.
Firms are more likely to export a high-quality product to establish their rep-
utation in new markets when the number of competing firms is small. However,
in mature markets, they are more likely to export a high-quality product rather
than a low-quality one when the number of competing firms are large. Hence,
if the government wants firms to export a high-quality product to new markets,
it should temporarily limit the number of competing firms.
Once the reputation of a product is established and consumers possess infor-
mation about their own valuation, competition induces both incumbent firms
and new entrants to choose the choice of a high-quality product. The government
then should remove all barriers to entry. In mature markets, a competition alone
is sufficient to promote the transition to the viable high-quality export markets
but it is not in new markets.
6Mazzaeo (2003) showed that on-time flight performance increases dramatically when a
second no-stop carrier serves a route. Again in 2004, Cohen and Mazzeo explored service
quality in the banking industry, finding a positive relationship between the number of firms
and the quality of a service.
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5 Welfare Implications
This section studies the welfare implications of establishing a quality reputation.
In view of the analysis in Secion 3, establishing a quality reputation does not
always provide the largest benefits for firms; on the contrary, firms, in some
situations, may be better off by choosing the choice of a low-quality product. Is
the choice of a high-quality product always the best choice for the country of
export?
Basically, the welfare measure used is aggregate consumer surplus plus firm
profits; nevertheless, the former is not taken into consideration in this analysis
because this study focuses on the behaviour of home firms in foreign markets.
Neither home consumer surplus nor foreign consumer surplus affects the welfare
in the home country. In accordance with the assumptions of a model, the ex-
pected welfare of establishing a quality reputation in the home country can be
defined as:
W eH = Π˜ + δθΠH
Where Π =
∑n
i=1 pi
i. In spite of the fact that a high-quality product is provided
to foreign consumers who lack information about their own valuation, it is not
necessary that all foreign consumers will give a high valuation to a high-quality
product. Only consumers whose tastes match to a product will purchase a high-
quality product with a high price in the next transactions.
In contrast, if home firms decide not to position their product as high quality,
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the expected welfare of exporting a low-quality product in the home country can
be shown as:
W eL = ΠL + δΠL
When home firms offer and provide a low-quality product to foreign consumers,
theses consumers will update nothing about their own type. Therefore, con-
sumers are unwilling to pay a premium for a high-quality product while home
firms are unwilling to lower the price of a high-quality product. The future
transactions will only occur in a low-quality product only.
Due to Π˜ < piL < ΠH and θ ≤ 1, the home country will gain from positioning
its exported product as high quality if, and only if, the following condition holds:
θ ≥
[
(1 + δ)ΠL − Π˜
δΠH
]
(8)
This indicates that if a fraction of consumers, whose tastes match to a product,
is large enough, establishing the quality reputation of an exported product will
lead to a welfare improvement. Otherwise, it will cause a welfare reduction.
Now let consider the case that consumers in foreign markets know their own
valuation for the quality of a product. The expected welfare of quality upgrading
in the home country is equal to:
W eH = θΠH + δθΠH
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If home country choose to export a low-quality product, the expected welfare in
the home country is:
W eL = (1− θ)ΠL + δ(1− θ)ΠL
Accordingly, the quality upgrading of an export product will improve the home
country’s welfare only if:
θ ≥
[
ΠL
ΠH + ΠL
]
(9)
These results suggest that establishing the quality reputation of a new home
product in foreign markets may improve or reduce the welfare in the home
country depending on a parameter θ. In other word, with a large fraction of
consumers whose tastes match to a new product, establishing a reputation in
foreign markets by offering and delivering a high-quality product will improve the
home country’s welfare. Similarly, upgrading the quality of an existing product
will lead to a welfare gain when a fraction θ is large.
The parameter θ may be interpreted as a proportion of high-income con-
sumers. Consumers may satisfy and prefer a high-quality product to a low-
quality product but a high-quality product may be unaffordable for low-income
consumers. No one rejects that German cars are one of the best automobiles in
the world; however, being the best quality automobiles does not means that they
are suitable for all consumers. For example, some consumers choose Japanese
cars for reasons of economy. Some prefer German cars but purchase cheap Ko-
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rean cars since they cannot afford to buy the best quality cars with every high
price. Therefore, if target markets are satisfied with a standard-quality product
with moderate price, why firms will need to offer a high-quality product with
high production cost to such markets.
The production of a high-quality product is often considered as a pre-condition
for export success and, ultimately, for economic development. Hence, establish-
ing the quality reputation of a new product by upgrading the quality of an export
product seems to be a desirable outcome for the exporting countries. Neverthe-
less, it is found that it may cause a reduction in the welfare in exporting countries
if the parameter θ is small.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a finite two-stage game model where consumers lack in-
formation about their own valuation for the quality of a new product to study
firms’ quality choices. With the presence of asymmetric information, the need
to establish a quality reputation may not be sufficient to induce firms to choose
a high-quality product. It is found that the likelihood that a firm will choose
to establish a quality reputation by upgrading the quality of an export product
increases with the number of experienced consumers. However, it decreases with
the number of competing firms in a concerning industry.
Accordingly, home firms are less likely to export a high-quality product to
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new markets, where none of consumers are experienced, than mixed markets
and mature markets. However, if the probability that consumers will assign
a high valuation to a high-quality product is sufficient large, the result will
be reversed. That is, home firms are the most likely to export a high-quality
product when they enter into new markets. Therefore, the larger number of
experienced consumers causes home firms have more incentive to upgrade the
quality of their product.
To improve a probability of a high-quality product being exported, the home
government has to increase the number of experienced consumers in target for-
eign markets. When the government introduces and provides a high-quality
product to inexperienced consumers, these consumers become experienced con-
sumers. As a result, home firms will gain more from choosing the choice of
a high-quality product. Furthermore, the government can support home firms
to establish the quality reputation of an exported product by subsidising firms
directly, but it has to be specific to products with high quality only.
Since the likelihood of establishing a quality reputation decreases with the
number of competing firms in the case of new markets; the government then
has to limit the number of competing firms to improve the expected payoff from
choosing high quality. However, when the quality reputation of a product is
established in target foreign markets and foreign consumers possess information
about their own valuation, the government should remove all entry restrictions
because, in mature markets, competition is sufficient to promote the transition
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to the viable high-quality export markets.
However, these results may be changed if the model is extended to be longer
or infinite since consumers in new markets have opportunities to learn about
their true type after being deluded. With a long time horizon, home firms may
have either more or less incentive to export a high-quality product depending on
many factors. On the one hand, given the large discount factor, home firms may
be more likely to choose the choice of a high-quality product for establishing the
quality reputation of a product and themselves when start entering new foreign
markets because of the larger expected gains from doing that. On the other
hand, home firms may be more likely to milk their reputation to earn short-run
gains if consumers in markets are fast learning or they frequently update their
belief about the quality reputation of a product.
Finally, the welfare implications of establishing a quality reputation is ex-
amined. It is found that the welfare of exporting a high-quality product in the
home country may be improved or reduced depending on a fraction of consumers
whose tastes are a good match with a home product, θ. The choice of a high-
quality product will lead to a welfare gains if, and only if, the parameter θ is
large enough.
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Chapter 2: Why is it so difficult to
settle a private agreement in
an antidumping case ?
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Abstract
Many research papers argue that the antidumping measure has become one
of the most important instruments for protection in the international trade sys-
tem; domestic industries are more likely to employ this measure to threaten and
induce foreign industries to collude. Recent evidence, however, reveals that only
one-quarter of antidumping cases actually conclude with a price-undertaking
agreement, or a private settlement. This paper employs a simple take-it-or-
leave-it bargaining game with two-sided asymmetric information to reconcile
the theoretical results with observation. With two-sided asymmetric informa-
tion, the probability of bargaining failure is positive. The likelihood that the
domestic and foreign firm will collude increases with the probability of a high-
type foreign firm and the probability of a low-type domestic firm. However,
it decreases with the bargaining power and concentration level of the domestic
firm. The small number of private settlements indicates the inefficient outcome
of the bargaining game with asymmetric information rather than evidence of
the antidumping measure being less misused as a collusive tool.
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1 Introduction
From a mostly unused and troublesome trade policy instrument, an antidumping
measure has become a preferable means for obtaining protection from the gov-
ernment. Frequently, the domestic industry misuses the antidumping measure
to threaten and induce foreign industry to collude. There has been suspicion
that the antidumping measure has been used as a collusive device rather than a
defensive tool against unfair competition or a trade remedy, as the original ob-
jective. If arguments that the domestic industry often misuses the antidumping
measure as a credible threat to induce foreign firms to collude and that collusion
is a preferable outcome for both are valid, the number of firms settling with a
private agreement will be high. However, the actual number of price-undertaking
agreements during these recent years has not been high as expected.
This paper is inspired by an inconsistency between the previous theoretical
results and actual observations. While theoretical works such as Prusa (1992),
Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999), and Zanardi (2004) argue that the an-
tidumping measure supports collusive outcomes, the actual data tells a different
story; only one-fourth of total antidumping cases around the world result in a
price-undertaking settlement. This study applies a simple take-it-or-leave-it bar-
gaining game with two-sided asymmetric information to examine the behaviour
of firms in an attempt to answer the following questions. Firstly, does the bar-
gaining game guarantee the existence of collusion with certainty? Secondly, if a
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bargaining failure exists, what is the main cause of this failure? Thirdly, what
determines the likelihood of collusion? Finally, does the small number of price-
undertaking agreements indicate a decline in the misuse of the antidumping
measure during recent years?
With two-sided asymmetric information, the domestic and foreign firm will
fail to collude with a positive probability. That is the private agreement will
be settled with a positive probability but not certainty, except in the case that
the domestic firm employs a pooling strategy and the probability of a low-
type foreign firm is significant small. This is inconsistent with Prusa (1992),
whose model predicts that collusion is preferable. In other word, settling a
private agreement is a strategic dominance for both domestic and foreign firms.
With one-sided asymmetric information, the probability to collude is higher
than cases involving two-sided asymmetric information. This indicates that the
asymmetry of information between the domestic and foreign firm is the main
cause of bargaining failure.
The likelihood of collusion is found to increase with the probability of a
high-type foreign firm and the probability of a low-type domestic firm. How-
ever, the possibility of settling the private agreement is more likely to decrease
when the bargaining power and concentration level of the domestic firm in-
creases, this contradicts the results of Zanardi (2004). Hence, the small number
of price-undertaking agreements is evidence of bargaining inefficiency caused by
asymmetric information, not a decline in the use of the antidumping measure as
55
a collusive device.
The findings also show that the efficient outcome does not guarantee to
improve the social welfare in home country where a dump occurs; in contrast,
it may deteriorate the welfare. The settlement outcome will be socially optimal
if, and only if, a share of the collusive profits for the foreign firm is significant
small. Otherwise, it only improves the profit of the domestic firm, not the social
welfare. Moreover, the antidumping duty outcome, which raises the profit of
the domestic firm, is more likely to have a negative effect on the home country’s
welfare. Therefore, the antidumping measure as a collusive device or a protective
tool should not be allowed to happen.
To prevent the misuse of the antidumping measure, the antiduming laws
have to be clear and transparent. The same standards and practices of the
antidumping measure have to be applied across countries to ensure that the
decision of antidumping cases is determined in accordance with rules and actual
evidence and not be interfered by political and economic pressures from both
inside and outside the country. Thus, a harnomisation of the antidumping laws
across countries is needed.
This paper is organised as follows. The literature relating to the relationship
between antidumping and collusion is reviewed in the next section. Section
3 introduces a bargaining model with two-sided asymmetric information. The
equilibrium of the simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game when the domestic
firm employs (i) a pooling strategy, (ii) a separating strategy, and (iii) a semi-
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separating strategy is shown in Section 4. Section 5 employs a bargaining game
with one-sided asymmetric information to examine whether a simple take-it-or-
leave-it procedure is a cause of bargaining failure. The welfare implications of
antidumping outcomes is considered in Section 6. Section 7 discusses on whether
the antidumping laws should be harmonised. Finally, the conclusion is presented
in Section 8.
2 Literature Review
An expansion in the utilisation of antidumping measures around the world has
motivated both theoretical and empirical studies on the antidumping argument;
one strand of literature, which includes Dixit (1988), Anderson (1992, 1993),
Reitzes (1993), Prusa (1994) and Blonigen and Jee-Hyeong (2004), deals with
the impact of measures on the decision of firms. Anderson (1992, 1993) examines
the potential interdependence of antidumping with voluntary export restraints
(VERs); his results suggest that foreign firms have an incentive to dump in order
to gain a larger market share. In contrast, Prusa (1994) claims that foreign firms
will increase their price in a domestic market even though domestic firms will
reduce their price because they do not want to be duped into dumping.
Reitze (1993) argues that the strategic behaviour of firms is altered under
the antidumping measure, since this measure represents a credible threat to
impose future duties based on the current price differential between the domes-
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tic and foreign market. His results show that under Cournot competition, the
threat of antidumping enforcement by the domestic country induces domestic
output increases and foreign export decreases. Under Bertrand competition and
imperfect substitutes, the antidumping measure induces foreign firms to raise
their export price and lower their local price. If the game is extended to more
than two periods, the antidumping measure may cause foreign firms to employ
a hit-and-run strategy and also encourage the entry of new domestic firms.
Blonigen and Jee-Hyeong (2004) find that with uncertain enforcement of
the antidumping measure, a foreign firm will increase its price in a domestic
market if there is a large probability that the antidumping duty will be exercised.
However, it will decrease its price if there is a large probability that the VER
will be exercised. This finding is consistent with Anderson’s results.
Another strand deals more specifically with the relationship between an-
tidumping and collusion; almost all studies suggest that the antidumping mea-
sure is used for a collusive purpose. With a repeated game model, Staiger and
Wolak (1989) show that a domestic industry can use the antidumping measure
as a credible threat if a foreign industry deviates from collusion. Moreover,
Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) studied the possibility that the European
antidumping measure causes collusion amongst firms. Their findings suggest
that the antidumping measure cartelises the market. Similar to Tivig and Walz
(2000), the antidumping measure acts as an anti-competitive measure.
In 1992, Prusa introduced a bargaining model with common knowledge on
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the probability of an affirmative outcome, ρ.1 His results suggest that the an-
tidumping petition serves as a tool to achieve collusion. The threat of antidump-
ing duties induces foreign firms to negotiate with domestic firms. Both domestic
and foreign firms almost always prefer to withdraw a petition and reach a pri-
vate agreement, regardless of the value of ρ. This model succeeds in explaining
why many antidumping petitions are withdrawn before reaching a final decision.
However, it fails to explain why not all petitions are withdrawn. According to
the data presented in his paper, on average petitions were withdrawn only 38
per cent of the US antidumping cases during 1980-1985.
In order to reconcile Prusa’s results with the observation that only some
petitions are withdrawn, Zanardi (2004) modifies Prusa’s model by introduc-
ing coordination costs and bargaining powers of domestic and foreign firms.
His theoretical and empirical results, consistently with other studies, support
a hypothesis that the antidumping measure is used as a collusive device. The
probability of petition withdrawal decreases with coordination costs and non-
linearly increases with bargaining power. The lower the concentration is, the less
likely the private agreement will be settled.2 Zanardi employs the U.S. data from
1980 to 1997 and finds a statistically significant negative relationship between
the probability of withdrawal and the industry concentration index, which rep-
1Refers to a situation where an antidumping duty is levied in response to petition from
domestic firms.
2Coordination costs are sunk costs that are positively related to the number of firms, as
the larger the number of firms, the more difficult it is to find a common strategy. Thus, the
coordination costs are high.
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resents the measurement of coordination costs, but a positive relationship with
employment and the number of previously filed petitions, which is the proxies
of bargaining power.
3 The Model
Assuming that a domestic market features one domestic firm and one foreign
firm, each firm is risk-neutral, produces homogeneous goods, competes in quan-
tity in a home market, and faces the same demand function and marginal cost.
A status-quo equilibrium is determined by Cournot competition between the
domestic and foreign firm. Under these assumptions, there exists a unique equi-
librium where both the domestic and foreign firm enjoy the same profits.
ΠC = Π∗C =
(
a− c
3
)2
Where ΠC and Π∗C are the Cournot equilibrium profit of the domestic and for-
eign firm respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the foreign firm dumps its product into the home market, the game begins.
In the first stage, the domestic firm decides whether to file an antidumping
petition. If the domestic firm does not file the petition, the game ends and the
payoff to the domestic and foreign firm are defined as Π˜ and Π˜∗, respectively.
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The more the foreign products are dumped, the more the domestic price falls.3
Hence, the profit of the domestic firm when a dump occurs is less than the
Cournot profit. That is Π˜ < ΠC .
On the contrary, if the domestic firm files the petition, the antidumping in-
vestigation starts and the game progresses to the second stage. Now both the
domestic and foreign firm simultaneously decide whether to negotiate for the
private agreement. If not, the payoff to the domestic and foreign firm will be
determined by the final decision. If authorities decide to levy an extra duty
on products from the foreign firms as a penalty for dumping, that is an affir-
mative outcome, the payoff to the domestic and foreign firm are ΠD and Π∗D,
respectively. However, if authorities decide not to levy extra duty or impose any
restriction on foreign products, that is a negative outcome, the payoff to the
domestic and foreign firm are assumed to be the Cournot profit as a status-quo
equilibrium.
Lemma 1 ΠD > ΠC and Π∗D < Π∗C
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 A domestic firm always files a petition when dumping occurs.
Proof. See Appendix.
3The impact of the quantity of the foreign firm on the profit of the domestic firm is:
∂Π
∂q∗
=
∂Π
∂P
∂P
∂q∗
< 0
The profit of the domestic firm is a decreasing function of the quantity of the foreign firm.
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The lowest expected payoff to the domestic firm if it files the petition is
ΠC > Π˜, then filling the petition is a strictly dominant strategy for the domestic
firm. When the foreign products are dumped into the home market, the domestic
firm always files the antidumping petition.
If the domestic and foreign firm agree to negotiate, the game reaches the
bargaining stage. Assume that a take-it-or-leave it procedure is employed. That
is, the domestic firm makes an offer, the foreign firm decides whether accepts
or rejects it, and the game ends. If the foreign firm accepts, the payoff to the
domestic and foreign firm are defined as ΠS and Π∗S, respectively. However, if
it rejects, the payoff for the domestic (foreign) firm is either ΠD (Π∗D) or ΠC
(Π∗C), depending on the final outcome.
Take-it-or-Leave-it Bargaining Game
Consider a bargaining game with two-sided asymmetric information. For sim-
plification, assume that there are two types of firms: a high-type firm (H) and
a low-type firm (L). A high-type firm refers to a firm where strongly influences
the final outcome whereas a low-type firm refers to a firm where lacks significant
influence over the final outcome. Generally, the final outcome is more likely to
favour a high-type firm than a low-type firm. If the domestic firm is the high
type, authorities are more likely to decide to levy antidumping duties on the
foreign products. In contrast, if the foreign firm is the high type, authorities are
more likely to decide not to levy antidumping duties on those.
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Denote k and k∗ as the type of domestic and foreign firm; the domestic
(foreign) firm is either k = H (k∗ = H) or k = L (k∗ = L). The domestic
firm has a prior belief (ηH , ηL) over the type of foreign firm, and the foreign
firm has a prior belief (γH , γL) over the type of domestic firm; these probability
distributions are common knowledge. Each party cares about the identity of
its opponent because the different types of firms will generally affect the final
outcome.4
Rather than assuming that the probability of an affirmative outcome (ρ) is
exogenously determined and known by both domestic and foreign firms, as Prusa
(1992) and Zanardi (2004) claim, this paper assumes the type of domestic and
foreign firm involved will influence ρ. The probability of an affirmative outcome,
regardless of the type of foreign firm, is higher for the high-type domestic firm
than the low-type. On the other hand, the probability of an affirmative outcome,
is lower for the high-type foreign firm than the low-type one.
Let ρk,k∗ be the probability of an affirmative outcome when the domestic
firm is k type and the foreign firm is k∗ type. The following inequality equations
4Theoretically, the final decision should be purely determined by the rules and procedures
according to the regulations. However, empirical studies suggest that the characteristic of the
industry affects the final result. For example, the larger-sized industries generally receive more
protection from the government than the smaller-sized industries, since they can provide more
votes and more money to support political campaigns. Similar to the industry concentration,
the more concentrated the industries are, the more protection is provided because of fewer
free-rider problems, fewer communication problems, more opportunities to reach a consensus,
effective organisation and better pressuring of the decision makers.
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are assumed to hold throughout the paper:
ρLH < ρLL < ρHL
ρLH < ρHH < ρHL
These imply that the probability of antidumping duties being levied is the largest
when the domestic firm is the high type and the foreign firm is the low type.
In contrast, if the domestic firm is the low type and the foreign firm is the high
type, the probability of antidumping duties of being levied is the lowest. In
other word, the probability of a negative outcome is the highest.
Before arrival of a final decision, assume that the domestic and foreign firm
choose to bargain over a fraction α of the monopoly profits when α ∈ (0, 1). If the
domestic firm makes an offer α and the foreign firm accepts it, the payoff to the
domestic and foreign firm from settling the private agreement is ΠS = (1−α)ΠM
and Π∗S = αΠM , respectively. The foreign firm updates its belief in accordance
with Bayes’ rule after observing an offer α. The foreign firm’s posterior belief
on the k-type domestic firm (µ∗k) when α is offered is:
µ∗k =
γksk(α)
γLsL(α) + γHsH(α)
Where sk(α) is the probability that the k-type domestic firm offers term α.
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If both parties fail to reach an agreement, the expected payoff to the k-type
domestic firm is:
Πk = ηLΠkL + ηHΠkH
= ηL
[
ρkLΠ
D + (1− ρkL)ΠC
]
+ ηH
[
ρkHΠ
D + (1− ρkH)ΠC
] (1)
Similarly, the expected payoff to the k∗-type foreign firm is:
Π
∗
k∗ = µ
∗
LΠ
∗
Lk∗ + µ
∗
HΠ
∗
Hk∗
= µ∗L
[
ρ∗Lk∗Π
∗D + (1− ρ∗Lk∗)Π∗C
]
+ µ∗H
[
ρ∗Hk∗Π
∗D + (1− ρ∗Hk∗)Π∗C
] (2)
If the foreign firm accepts term α with probability a(α), where a(α) =
ηLaL(α) + ηHaH(α), the expected payoff to the k-type domestic firm when it
makes the offer α and the foreign firm accepts it with probability a(α) ≤ ηL,
that is, only the low-type foreign firm accepts the offer, is:
ΠSk (α, a ≤ ηL) = ηLaL(1− α)ΠM + ηL(1− aL)ΠkL + ηHΠkH (3)
If term α is accepted with probability a(α) > ηL, that is,only the high-type
foreign firm rejects the offer, the expected payoff to the k-type domestic firm is:
ΠSk (α, a > ηL) = ηL(1− α)ΠM + ηHaH(1− α)ΠM + ηH(1− aH)ΠkH (4)
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, the domestic firm never makes an offer α, which
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results in: ΠSk (α, a(α)) < Πk.
Proof. See Appendix.
As the term α increases, the possibility that the foreign firm will accept the
offer increases but the expected payoff from settling the private agreement to
the domestic firm decreases. The domestic firm faces a trade off between the
possibility of reaching an agreement and gaining a share of the collusive profits.
If the domestic and the foreign firm fail to reach an agreement, the expected
payoff to the domestic firm will be Πk. Therefore, the domestic firm will never
offer any terms α if (1−α)ΠM ≡ ΠSk < Πk, although such terms will be certainly
accepted by the foreign firm.
4 The Equilibrium
When the domestic and foreign firm are uncertain about the type of each other
and a take-it-or-leave-it procedure is adopted, the private agreement will be
certainly reached if, and only if, the domestic firm employs a pooling strategy
and the probability of a low-type foreign firm is significant small. Otherwise,
the private agreement will fail with a positive probability.
The rest of the section presents the set of Bayesian equilibria of a take-it-or-
leave-it game as follows: (i) pooling equilibrium, (ii) separating equilibrium and
(iii) semi-separating equilibrium.
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Pooling Equilibrium
Assuming that the domestic firm offers the same term α, irrespective of its
type, the foreign firm learns nothing more about the domestic firm’s type after
receiving the offer α. The posterior belief of the foreign firm is the same as the
corresponding prior belief, µ∗L(α) = γL and µ
∗
H(α) = γH . The k
∗ type foreign
firm’s outside option when it rejects term α is Π
∗
k∗ . Hence, the foreign firm will
choose to take a risk on the final outcome if Π∗S < Π
∗
. Irrespective of the type of
domestic firm, the expected payoff to the high-type foreign firm is always higher
than the low-type firm. That is, Π
∗
H > Π
∗
L. Consequently, when the low-type
foreign rejects the offer, none of the foreign firms will accept it. At the same
time, if the high-type foreign firm accepts the offer, all foreign firms will accept
it.
With a sequentially rational response, none of the foreign firms will accept
the domestic firm’s offer if αΠM < Π
∗
L or a(α) = 0, whereas the foreign firm
will certainly accept the offer when αHΠ
M ≥ Π∗H or a(αH) = 1. At least some
of the low-type foreign firm will accept the offer if αLΠ
M = Π
∗
L or a(αL) ≤ ηL.
Hence, the expected payoff to the k type domestic firm when offers (i) α < αL,
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(ii) α = αL and (iii) α = αH can be shown as:
ΠSk (αΠ
M < Π
∗
L, 0) = Πk
ΠSk (αLΠ
M = Π
∗
L, a(αL)) = ηLa(αL)(Π
M − Π∗L − ΠkL) + Πk
ΠSk (αHΠ
M = Π
∗
H , 1) = Π
M − Π∗H
(5)
Proposition 2 Pooling equilibria are characterised as follows, depending on
which one of these three payoffs:-ΠSk (αΠ
M < Π
∗
L, 0), Π
S
k (αLΠ
M = Π
∗
L, a(αL)),
ΠSk (αHΠ
M = Π
∗
H , 1) - is the largest
(i) If ΠSk (αΠ
M < Π
∗
L, 0) is the largest, a pooling equilibrium exists in which
both the domestic and foreign firm prefer to take a risk on the final result;
(ii) If ΠSk (αLΠ
M = Π
∗
L, a(αL)) is the largest, a pooling equilibrium exists in
which the private agreement is settled with a positive probability but not cer-
tainty;
(iii) If ΠSk (αHΠ
M = Π
∗
H , 1) is the largest, a pooling equilibrium exists in which
the private agreement is settled with certainty.
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Proposition 2, the private agreement will be settled with cer-
tainty if, and only if, a condition a(αL) ≤
(
ΠM−Π∗H−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗L−ΠHL
)
is satisfied. The private
agreement between the domestic and foreign firm will fail with a positive prob-
ability, otherwise. This implies that the smaller the probability of a low-type
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foreign firm is, the more likely the domestic firm offers a larger share of the
collusive profits, which is rarely rejected by the foreign firm.
When condition (a) ΠM > Π
∗
L + ΠHL and (b) a(αL) ≥
(
ΠM−Π∗H−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L−ΠLL
)
hold,
the private agreement will be settled with a positive probability but not certainty.
If the domestic firm has a strong prior belief that the foreign firm is the low type,
it will offer only a smaller share of the collusive profits, which is likely rejected by
the high-type foreign firm. However when condition (a) is violated, the high-type
domestic firm prefers to take a risk on the final outcome.
Before leaving this part, consider who gains from the existence of a pooling
equilibrium. Whether (ii) or (iii) exists, the low-type domestic firm gains from
the presence of the high type, whereas the high-type domestic firm losses from
the presence of the low type.5 In the presence of the high-type domestic firm, the
foreign firm is willing to accept a smaller share of the collusive profits compare
to the case of absence. At the same time, the high-type domestic firm has to
offer a larger share of the collusive profits to induce the foreign accepts the offer
when its type is not conclusively known.
5These cases are similar to adverse selection models such as the insurance market.(see
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977))
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Separating Equilibrium
If the different types of domestic firms choose a different offer term, the domestic
firm’s type is fully revealed. Assume that the high-type domestic firm offers αH
with probability sH(αH) = 1 and the low-type domestic firm offers αL with
probability sL(αL) = 1. The foreign firm’s posterior belief of the high-type
domestic firm, when it receives the offer term αH , is µ
∗
H(αH) = 1 and its posterior
belief on the low-type domestic firm, when it receives the offer term αL, is
µ∗L(αL) = 1. Hence, if the k
∗ type foreign firm rejects the offer αH , its expected
payoff will be:
Π
∗
Hk∗(αH) = ρ
∗
Hk∗Π
∗D + (1− ρ∗Hk∗)Π∗C
Similarly, the expected payoff for the k∗ foreign firm when rejects the offer αL
is equal to
Π
∗
Lk∗(αL) = ρ
∗
Lk∗Π
∗D + (1− ρ∗Lk∗)Π∗C
Among all separating equilibria, if the high-type domestic firm offers the for-
eign firm αHLΠ
M = Π
∗
HL, the low-type foreign firm will accept with probability
aL(αHL) but the high-type foreign firm will certainly reject it. The expected
payoff to the high-type domestic firm when offers αHL can be shown as:
ΠSH(αHL, a(αHL)) = ηLaL(αHL)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL
)
+ ηL (1− aL(αHL)) ΠHL + ηHΠHH
(6)
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When the low-type domestic firm offers αLHΠ
M = Π
∗
LH , none of the foreign
firms will reject this offer, a(αLH) = 1. The expected payoff to the low-type
domestic firm is:
ΠSL(αLH , 1) = Π
M − Π∗LH (7)
The high-type domestic firm will not deviate from its choice when a con-
dition a(αHL) ≥
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
is satisfied. Similarly, the low-type domestic
firm will not deviate if a condition a(αHL) ≤
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠLL
)
holds. Hence,
the low-type domestic firm will offer a lager fraction of αLH , which none of
the foreign firms reject it and the high-type firm will offer a smaller frac-
tion of αHL, which only some of the low-type foreign firms accept it when(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
≤ a(αHL) ≤
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠLL
)
is satisfied.
Proposition 3 When the different types of domestic firms choose to make a
different offer, the domestic firm’s private information is fully transmitted to the
foreign firm. When a condition
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
≤ a(αHL) ≤
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠLL
)
holds, a separating equilibrium where the low-type domestic firm offers αLH and
the high-type domestic firm offers αHL exists. As a result, the private agreement
will fail with a positive probability.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result shows that the expected payoff from settling the private agree-
ment to the high-type domestic firm increases, whereas the expected payoff to
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the low-type domestic firm decrease when the domestic firm’s type is fully re-
vealed to the foreign firm. The low-type firm losses from signalling the foreign
firm that it is the low type because it must offer a larger share of the collusive
profits to induce the foreign firm to accept its offer. In contrast, the high-type
domestic firm gains from signalling that it is the high type.
Semi-separating Equilibrium
If the domestic firm employs a mixed strategy, the semi-separating equilibrium
may exist. Firstly, the high-type domestic firm adopts a mixed strategy. Assume
that the high-type domestic firm offers αˆ with probability sH(αˆ) = β and α´ < αˆ
with probability sH(α´) = 1− β, while the low-type domestic firm offers αˆ with
probability sL(αˆ) = 1. After receiving the offer αˆ, the foreign firm’s posterior
belief is µ∗L(αˆ) > γL and µ
∗
H(αˆ) < γH , respectively. In addition, when the foreign
firm receives the offer α´, its posterior belief of the high-type domestic firm is
µ∗H(α´) = 1.
The expected payoff to the k∗ type foreign firm when it rejects the offer αˆ is:
Π
∗
k∗(µ
∗
L(αˆ), µ
∗
H(αˆ)) = µ
∗
LΠ
∗
Lk∗ + µ
∗
HΠ
∗
Hk∗
> Π
∗
k∗(γL, γH)
While if it rejects the offer α´, the expected payoff to the k∗ foreign firm is:
Π
∗
Hk∗(µ
∗
H(α´) = 1) = ρ
∗
Hk∗Π
∗D + (1− ρ∗Hk∗)Π∗C
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When the domestic firm offers αˆ where αˆΠM = Π
∗
H(αˆ) > Π
∗
H , the foreign firm
will certainly accept it. On the contrary, if the domestic firm makes the offer α´
where α´ΠM = Π
∗
HL, only the low-type foreign firm will accept this offer. In other
word, the foreign firm accepts the offer α´ = αHL with probability a(α´) ≤ ηL.
Given the best response of the foreign firm, the expected payoff to the low-
type domestic firm, when it certainly offers αˆ is:
ΠSL(sL(αˆ) = 1) = Π
M − Π∗H(αˆ) (8)
The expected payoff to the high-type domestic firm when offers αˆ with proba-
bility β and α´ with probability 1− β is:
ΠSH(sH(αˆ) = β, sH(α´) = 1− β) = β
(
ΠM − Π∗H(αˆ)
)
+ (1− β)
{
a(α´)(ΠM − Π∗HL)
}
+ (1− β){(ηL − a(α´))ΠHL + ηHΠHH}
(9)
The low-type domestic firm has no incentive to deviate from offering αˆ with
certainty when a condition a(α´) ≤
(
ΠM−Π∗H(αˆ)−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠL
)
holds. Similarly, the high-
type domestic firm will not deviate from offering αˆ with probability β and α´ with
probability 1−β, if a condition a(α´) =
(
ΠM−Π∗H(αˆ)−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
is satisfied. Hence, nei-
ther the low-type nor the high-type domestic firm will deviate from its choice
when a(α´) =
(
ΠM−Π∗H(αˆ)−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
holds. Now a type I semi-equilibrium, where the
high-type domestic firm adopts a mixed strategy, is established.
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Proposition 4 If a separating equilibrium, as stated in Proposition 3, exists,
it guarantees that a type I semi-separating equilibrium, where the high-type
domestic firm employs a mixed strategy, will exist.
Proof. See Appendix.
Secondly, the low-type domestic firm employs a mixed strategy. The low-
type domestic firm is assumed to randomly offer α˜ with probability sL(α˜) = λ
and α` > α˜ with probability sL(α`) = 1− λ, whereas the high-type domestic firm
certainly offers α˜, or sH(α˜) = 1. The foreign firm updates its belief about the
type of domestic firm in accordance with Bayes’ rule. It believes with certainty
that the domestic firm is the low type, that is, µ∗L(α`) = 1 after receiving the
offer α`. It also believes with probability µ∗L(α˜) < γL and µ
∗
H(α˜) > γH that the
domestic firm is the low type and the high type respectively, after receiving the
offer α˜.
The expected payoff to the k∗ type foreign firm, when it rejects the offer α˜,
is equal to:
Π
∗
k∗(µ
∗
L(α˜), µ
∗
H(α˜)) = µ
∗
LΠ
∗
Lk∗ + µ
∗
HΠ
∗
Hk∗
< Π
∗
k∗(γL, γH)
If the k∗ type foreign firm rejects the offer α`, its expected payoff will be:
Π
∗
Lk∗(µ
∗
L(α`) = 1) = ρ
∗
Lk∗Π
∗D + (1− ρ∗Lk∗)Π∗C
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If the domestic firm offers α˜ where α˜ΠM = Π
∗
L(α˜) < Π
∗
L, only the low-type
foreign firm will accept this offer. That is a(α˜) ≤ ηL. In contrast, when the
domestic firm offers α` where α`ΠM = Π
∗
LH , none of the foreign firms will reject
it.
Give the best response of the foreign firm, the expected payoff to the low-
type domestic firm, when offers α˜ with probability λ and α` with probability
1− λ, can be shown as:
ΠSL(sL(α˜) = λ, sL(α`) = 1− λ) = λ
{
a(α˜)(ΠM − Π∗L(α˜))
}
+ λ
{
(ηL − a(α˜))ΠLL + ηHΠLH
}
+ (1− λ)(ΠM − Π∗LH)
(10)
The expected payoff to the high-type domestic firm when certainly offers α`, can
be written as:
ΠSH(sH(α˜) = 1) = a(α˜)(Π
M − Π∗L(α˜))
+ (ηL − aL(α˜))ΠHL + ηHΠHH
(11)
The low-type domestic firm will not deviate from offering α˜ with probability
λ and α` with probability 1 − λ when a condition a(α˜) =
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L(α˜)−ΠLL
)
is
satisfied. Likewise, the high-type domestic firm has no incentive to deviate from
offering α˜ with certainty if ΠM > Π
∗
L + ΠHL and a(α˜) ≥
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗L(α˜)−ΠHL
)
hold.
Therefore, a type II semi-separating equilibrium, where the low-type domestic
75
firm employs a mixed strategy, is now established when (a) ΠM > Π
∗
L + ΠHL
and (b) a(α˜) =
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L(α˜)−ΠLL
)
hold.
Proposition 5 Neither the existence of a separating equilibrium in Proposi-
tion 3 nor the existence of a pooling equilibrium in Proposition 2 can guarantee
the existence of a type II semi-separating equilibrium, where the low-type do-
mestic firm employs a mixed strategy. This semi-equilibrium exists if, and only
if, ΠM > Π
∗
L + ΠHL and a(α˜) =
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L(α˜)−ΠLL
)
hold.
Proof. See Appendix.
The existence of a type I or a type II semi-separating equilibrium indicates
that when the domestic firm employed a mixed strategy, the private agreement
between the domestic and foreign firm will fail with a positive probability. Now
consider whether the high-type or the low-type domestic firm will benefit from
adopting a mixed strategy.
In accordance with the type I semi-separating equilibrium, when the high-
type domestic firm employs a mixed strategy to signal the foreign firm about
its type, the low-type and the high-type domestic firm worse off compared to a
pure pooling case. The domestic firm has to offer a larger share of the collusive
profits to induce the foreign firm to accept the offer. However, the low-type
domestic firm is better off when compared to a pure separating case.
For the type II semi-separating equilibrium, when the low-type firm adopts
a mixed strategy to signal its type to the foreign firm, the expected payoff to
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the high-type domestic firm is larger than a pure pooling cases whereas the
expect payoff to the low-type domestic firm is indifferent. Nevertheless, the
high-type domestic firm worses off compared to a pure separating case. These
show that the high-type domestic firm will gain the largest benefit when all
private information is fully transmitted to the foreign firm.
5 Efficiency
In the presence of the two-sided asymmetric information, a simple take-it-or-
leave-it bargaining game, where the domestic firm makes an offer, admits an
efficient equilibrium, that is an equilibrium where the private agreement is settled
with certainty, only if, the domestic firm employs a pooling strategy and the
probability of a low-type foreign firm is significant small. Otherwise, it does
not. If the domestic firm employs either a pure separating strategy or a mixed
strategy, the bargaining fails with a positive probability.
A question arises of whether a simple take-it-or-leave-it procedure or other
fundamental problems causes the bargaining failure. To explore this issue, sup-
pose the type of the foreign firm involved is public information, whereas the
type of domestic firm still retains private information. The domestic firm can
be either the high type with probability γH or the low type with probability γL.
The other assumptions remain the same.
When the domestic firm adopts a pooling strategy, the foreign firm’s posterior
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belief is the same as the corresponding prior belief, µ∗L(α) = γL and µ
∗
H(α) = γH .
The expected payoff to the k∗ foreign firm, when the bargaining fails, can be
shown as:
Π
∗
k∗ = γLΠ
∗
Lk∗ + γHΠ
∗
Hk∗
If the domestic firm offers αLΠ
M = Π
∗
L and αHΠ
M = Π
∗
H to the low-type and
high-type foreign firm respectively, the foreign firm is indifferent between taking
an offer or taking a risk on the final decision.
The low-type foreign firm will accept the offer αL and reject any offers that
α < αL. Thus, the expected payoff from settling the private agreement to the
domestic firm is:
ΠS(αL) = Π
M − Π∗L
Since the expected payoff to the high-type firm is always higher than the low-
type firm, so neither the high-type nor the low-type domestic firm will deviate
from this choice if the following condition holds:
ΠS(αL) = Π
M − Π∗L > ΠHL (12)
Similarly, the high-type foreign firm will accept the offer αH and reject any
offers that α < αH . Hence, the expected payoff to the domestic firm when settles
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the private agreement is:
ΠS(αH) = Π
M − Π∗H
None of the domestic firms will deviate from offering αH when the following
condition is satisfied:
ΠS(αH) = Π
M − Π∗H > ΠHH (13)
Due to ΠM > Π
∗
H+ΠH and ΠH > ΠHH , the the above condition is automatically
satisfied.
A pooling equilibrium, where the domestic firm offers αL to the low-type
foreign firm and αH to the high-type foreign firm, is established if the condition
stated in equation (12) holds. The existence of a pooling equilibrium here guar-
antees that the private agreement will be settled with certainty. In other word,
the game admits an efficient outcome. Efficiency in this bargaining game could
be improved if the type of the foreign firm is fully revealed. If the domestic firm
employs a pooling strategy, with two-sided asymmetric information, the private
agreement between the domestic and foreign firm may fail when the probability
of a low-type foreign firm is significant large. However, with one-sided asym-
metric information, the private agreement will be certainly settled.
The bargaining is more likely to fail under two-sided asymmetric information
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than under one-sided asymmetric information. This implies that the asymmet-
ric information between the domestic and the foreign firm is the main cause
of bargaining failure. As the asymmetric information decreases, bargaining ef-
ficiency is improved. A take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game will admit efficient
equilibrium outcomes as long as the type of the domestic and foreign firm are
fully revealed. This is consistent to Prusa (1992), settling the private agreement
is a preferable choice to both the domestic and foreign firm.
In the presence of the two-sided asymmetric information, the efficient equilib-
rium outcomes tend to increase with the probability of a high-type foreign firm
and the probability of a low-type domestic firm. The larger the probability of a
high-type foreign firm is, the smaller the probability of an affirmative outcome
is. Therefore, the domestic firm will offer a larger share of the collusive profits,
which the foreign firm will rarely rejects it. On the contrary, if the domestic firm
is the high type, the equilibrium outcomes are less likely to be efficient. The
high-type domestic firm is more likely to offer a smaller share of the collusive
profits to the foreign firm; as a result, the foreign firm, especially the high type,
may reject the offer and the private agreement may not be reached.
The bargaining power of the domestic firm increases with the probability of
an affirmative outcome but decreases with the probability of a negative outcome.
Therefore, the probability of efficient equilibrium outcomes decreases with the
bargaining power of the domestic firm. The higher the concentration level of the
domestic firm is, the larger the probability that the domestic firm offers a smaller
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share of the collusive profits. Hence, the probability of efficient equilibrium
outcomes decrease with the concentration level of the domestic firms. These
imply that the likelihood of collusion decreases with the bargaining power and
the concentration level of the domestic firm, which is inconsistent with Zanardi
(2004). His theoretical and empirical results suggest that the probability of
collusion increases with the bargaining power and the concentration level.
6 Welfare Implications
In this section, the welfare implications of antidumping outcomes are considered.
Welfare in Home country, denoted as W , is defined as the sum of consumer sur-
plus, domestic firm profit and antidumping-duty revenue, if any. The consumer
surplus in home country is:
CS =
1
2
(a− P )Q
Where P is the price in the home country and Q = q+ q∗ is the total quantities
purchased in the home country, which is the sum of quantities sold by the
domestic and the foreign firm respectively. The profit of the domestic firm
is equal to:
Π = (P − c) q
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and the antidumping-duty revenue can be defined as:
DR = tq∗
Where t is an antidumping duty per unit that the home government levies on
the foreign firm’s products in response to petitioning by the domestic firm.
Thus, welfare in the home country under Cournot competition is:
WC =
1
2
(
2a− 2c
3
)2
+
(
a− c
3
)2
(14)
When the antidumping duty t is levied on the foreign firm’s products, welfare
in the home country is then equal to:
WD =
1
2
(
2a− 2c− t
3
)2
+
(
a− c+ t
3
)2
+ t
(
a− c− 2t
3
)
(15)
If the domestic and foreign firm agree to settle the private agreement, welfare
in the home country will be:
W S =
1
2
(
a− c
2
)2
+ (1− α)
(
a− c
2
)2
(16)
Besides affecting the consumer surplus and the profit of the domestic firm,
the duty outcome also affects the revenue collected by the home government.
The welfare implications of the duty outcome may be positive or negative, but
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it is always inferior to the Cournot competition case. The net welfare effects
of the duty outcome will be positive if, and only if,
(
t
a−c
) ≤ (√7−1
3
)
. In other
word, an increase in the antidumping duty t leads to a greater deterioration of
consumer surplus.
On the contrary, the welfare under settlement outcome could be higher or
lower than the welfare under Cournot competition depending on a parameter
α, that is a collusive share of the foreign firm. The welfare of the settlement
outcome is superior to any other outcome if the domestic firm get a significant
large share of the collusive profits and leaves a small share of the foreign firm.
In other word, α ≤ 1
6
. If a gain in the domestic firm’s profit due to a collusion is
large enough to offset a loss in consumer surplus caused by a rising in the price.
The private agreement is the socially desirable choice to the home country.
Now consider the welfare implications of antidumping outcomes in foreign
country. Since antidumping outcomes affect neither consumer surplus nor duty
revenue in the foreign country, then welfare in the foreign country is equivalent
to the profit of the foreign firm. The welfare of Cournot competition, the duty
outcome and the settlement outcome in the foreign firm can be shown as follows:
W ∗C ≡ Π∗C =
(
a− c
3
)2
(17)
W ∗D ≡ Π∗D =
(
a− c− 2t
3
)2
(18)
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W ∗S ≡ Π∗S = α
(
a− c
2
)2
(19)
The welfare of the settlement outcome in the foreign country is superior to
any other outcome when α > 4
9
. That is, if a share of the collusive profits to the
foreign firm is significant large, the settlement outcome guarantees the welfare
improvement in the foreign country. However, if α <
[
16
9
(
t
a−c
)2 − 16
9
(
t
a−c
)
+ 4
9
]
,
paying the duty will provide a higher level of welfare than settling the private
agreement. In other word, the welfare of the settlement outcome is inferior to
any other outcome when a share of the collusive profits to the foreign firm is
very small. These suggest that the settlement outcome will only occur when[
16
9
(
t
a−c
)2 − 16
9
(
t
a−c
)
+ 4
9
]
≤ α ≤ 4
9
.6
The analysis above shows that if
[
16
9
(
t
a−c
)2 − 16
9
(
t
a−c
)
+ 4
9
]
> 1
6
, there never
exists the settlement outcome, which results in the welfare improvement. Since
the domestic firm concerns about its expected profit, not the social welfare.
Therefore, as long as the settlement payoff is not less than the expected payoff,
the domestic firm will choose the settlement outcome although it causes welfare
deterioration. The efficient outcomes are not equally socially desirable.
6The k∗ type foreign firm will compare the welfare of the settlement outcome to its expected
welfare, which is defined as:
W
∗
k∗ = ρkk∗W
∗D + (1− ρkk∗)W ∗C
The k∗ type foreign firm will agree to settle the private agreement if the welfare from settling
the private agreement is not less than its expected welfare from rejecting it. None of the
foreign firms will accept any offer terms α where W ∗S(α) < W ∗D but all of them will accept
the offer term α, in which it provides W ∗S(α) = W ∗C . Since the small probability of an
affirmative outcome improves the expected welfare of the foreign firm, that is
(
∂W
∗
k∗
∂ρkk∗
)
< 0.
Therefore, a share of the collusive profit to the foreign firm, α, is a decreasing function of the
probability of an affirmative outcome.
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7 Discussion
The results in previous sections indicate that the small number of price-undertaking
agreements during these recent years is not evidence of a decline in the use of
the antidumping measure as a collusive device. On the contrary, it reflects bar-
gaining inefficiency as a result of the asymmetric information. Now the question
is whether the collusion outcome really benefits the social welfare. If not, im-
proving the efficiency of bargaining becomes a trivial concern.
The home country’s welfare effects of the collusion outcome is ambiguous
depending on a collusive share of the foreign firm. If a collusive share of the
foreign firm is not significant small, the collusion outcome will not be the socially
desirable outcome to the home country. Similarly, the duty outcome may cause
the deterioration of welfare in the home country, if the antidumping duty is
significant large. Hence, the collusion outcome or the duty outcome should be
avoided if the home government aims to maximise the social welfare. The use
of antidumping as a collusive device or a protective tool is not desirable.
Besides, the antidumping measure also weakens the competitiveness of down-
stream firms. When the antidumping measure restricts imports of intermediate
goods and raw materials used in the production of final products, the cost of pro-
duction for domestic downstream firms is increased and, in consequence, their
capacity to compete with foreign producers inside and outside the country de-
creases. While the antidumping duties please the petitioning domestic upstream
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firms who can subsequently increase their price and gain greater profits, these
duties are costly to domestic downstream firms. The profit of domestic down-
stream firms is squeezed by higher production costs, due to antidumping duties,
and lower revenues, due to lost market share. As a result, domestic downstream
firms in the home country face a decreasing in profit or even a loss.
Therefore, the antidumping measure has to be used as needed only. No mat-
ter what the antidumping measure is used as a collusive device or as a protective
tool, it worsens the social welfare of its own country. In order to minimise losses
from the antidumping measure, the government should apply such measure only
to defend against unfair competition and remedy the material injury to the do-
mestic industries caused by dumping and be objective when making decision.
The decision on whether to impose antidumping duties on products imported
from the dumpers’ country should be made in accordance with rules and actual
evidence and independent of political and economic pressures from both inside
and outside the country.
Nowadays each country sets its own antidumping rules and practices as long
as they do not violate Article VI of GATT 1994, these rules and practices are
allowed by WTO. Consequently, the antidumping measure has become very
complicated, less transparent and varies from country to country. A possible
way to eliminate these problems is the harmonisation of the antidumping laws
across countries. Rules, regulations and procedures of the antidumping measure
across the WTO members will be the same without variation. The antidumping
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laws, then, will become clearer, more transparent and more consistent than they
are now.
As mentioned, when antidumping duties are imposed on products imported
from the dumper’s countries in order to penalise the dumpers and remedy the
injury to the domestic industries, these may harm the economy at large due to a
market distortion. Should levying the antidumping duties on products imported
from the dumpers be changed to collecting the antidumping penalties in a lump
sum? When the dumpers pay the antidumping penalties in a lump sum to
compensate the domestic industry where is injured from dumping, the market
will not be distorted. Under this alternative approach, the petitioning domestic
industries can be remedied without damaging other related industries.
8 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by an inconsistency between Prusa’s results and recent
observations. I employ a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with two-
sided asymmetric information, that is, both the domestic and foreign firm are
uncertain about the type of each other, to investigate the possibility of settling
a private agreement in an antidumping case.
The results show that, firstly, the private agreement will be settled with cer-
tainty if, and only if, the domestic firm employs a pooling strategy and the prob-
ability of a low-type foreign firm is significant small. Otherwise, there will exist
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the positive probability of bargaining failure. This contradicts Prusa (1999),
whose model predicts that the private agreement is always settled. Secondly,
the likelihood of settling the private agreement increases with the probability of
a high-type foreign firm and the probability of a low-type domestic firm. This
finding also implies that the likelihood of collusion decreases with the bargain-
ing power and the concentration level of the domestic firm, which is inconsistent
with Zanardi (2004).
According to previous theoretical studies, collusion is preferable. If this
argument is valid, the number of price-undertaking agreements should be large.
Nevertheless, only one-quarter of antidumping cases around the world result in
a price-undertaking agreement. It is overly optimistic to conclude that domestic
industries have recently employed the antidumping measure to defend against
unfair competition and remedy their injuries; they no longer use this measure
for collusive objection.
On the contrary, the small number of price-undertaking agreements indicates
bargaining inefficiency as a result of asymmetric information. The domestic and
the foreign firm are more likely to proceed with antidumping cases in the case
of two-sided asymmetric information than one-sided asymmetric information or
complete information. The domestic industries may still use the antidumping
measure as a collusive device. However, in the present of the asymmetric infor-
mation, the bargaining game admits the inefficient equilibrium outcomes with a
positive possibility.
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The home country’s welfare of the settlement outcome is superior to any
other outcome only if a collusive share of the domestic firm is large enough to
offset a loss in consumer surplus caused by an increasing in the price. Since
the domestic firm only concerns about its expected expected payoff, not the
social welfare. Therefore, with the small probability of an affirmative outcome,
the domestic firm may choose the settlement choice even though it may cause
the welfare deterioration. Frequently, the efficiency outcomes are not equally
socially desirable.
These findings suggest that the antidumping laws should be reformed. The
final outcome has to be solely determined by rules and regulations and remain
independent of political and economic pressures from inside and outside the
country. Nowadays, each country can set its own antidumping laws indepen-
dently. Thus, the antidumping laws have become very complicated, less trans-
parent and varied from country to country. To promote a clear and transparent
antidumping measure, the harmonisation of antidumping rules, regulations and
procedures is needed. The same standards and practices on the antidumping
measure have to be applied across countries.
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Appendix
Proof of ΠC = Π∗C
The inverse demand function for the domestic and foreign firm is defined as:
P = (a− q − q∗)
The domestic firm chooses q to maximise its profit given by:
Π = q(a− q − q∗ − c)
Similarly, the foreign firm chooses q∗ in order to maximise:
Π∗ = q∗(a− q − q∗ − c)
The best-response function of the domestic and foreign firm can be written as:
q =
(
a− q∗ − c
2
)
q∗ =
(
a− q − c
2
)
At equilibrium, the domestic and foreign firm supply their products in the home
market at:
qC = qC∗ =
(
a− c
3
)
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The Cournot equilibrium price and profit in the home market are:
PC =
(
a+ 2c
3
)
ΠC = Π∗C =
(
a− c
3
)2
Proof of Lemma 1
If an antidumping duty t is levied on foreign products when imported into the
Home market, the foreign firm will choose q∗ to maximise a new profit function:
Π∗D = q∗(a− q − q∗ − c− t)
The best-response function of the foreign firm when the antidumping duty t is
imposed is:
q∗D =
(
a− qD − c− t
2
)
Conversely, the domestic firm faces the same profit function when the antidump-
ing measure is applied, so the best-response function of the domestic firm is:
qD =
(
a− q∗D − c
2
)
At equilibrium when the antidumping duty is levied on the foreign firm’s prod-
ucts in response to petitioning by the domestic firm, the domestic firm supplies
more products, whereas the foreign firm supplies less products compared to the
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Cournot equilibrium.
qD =
(
a− c+ t
3
)
> qC
q∗D =
(
a− c− 2t
3
)
< q∗C
The price in the home market and the profit of the domestic and foreign firm
when the antidumping duty is levied are:
PD =
(
a+ 2c+ t
3
)
> PC
ΠD =
(
a− c+ t
3
)2
> ΠC
Π∗D =
(
a− c− 2t
3
)2
< Π∗C
Proof of Proposition 1
With a prior belief that an antidumping duty will be levied on the foreign
firm’s products with probability ρ, the expected payoff to the domestic firm from
filing an antidumping petition is:
Π = ρΠD + (1− ρ)ΠC
= ρ(ΠD − ΠC) + ΠC
Due to the fact that ΠD > ΠC and ΠC > Π˜, the result is Π > Π˜, even if ρ = 0.
Regardless of the domestic firm’s belief of the final outcome, the domestic firm
always chooses to file a petition if a dump occurs.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Given the best-response of the foreign firm a(α), the domestic firm will offer
α, which yields it the largest expected payoff. Therefore, the following condition
must hold in equilibrium:
piSH ≥ ΠH and piSL > ΠL
Let piSk be the highest payoff to the k-type domestic firm when making the
offer, so piSk ≥ ΠSk (α, a(α)) for all α. Since the expected payoff to the high-type
domestic firm if the domestic and foreign firm fail to reach a private agreement
is ΠH , then pi
S
H ≥ Π
S
H , as stated.
In contrast, if the low-type domestic firm offers αLLΠ
M = Π
∗
LL and this offer
is accepted with probability a(αLL) = ηL, then:
piSL ≥ ΠSL(αLL, ηL) = ηL
(
ΠM − Π∗LL
)
+ ηHΠLH
= ηL
(
ΠM − Π∗LL
)
+ ηHΠLH + ηLΠLL − ηLΠLL
= ΠL + ηL
(
ΠM − ΠLL − Π∗LL
)
Since ΠM > ΠLL + Π
∗
LL, the result is Π
S
L(αLL, ηL) > ΠL. Now the condition
piSL > ΠL is established.
The k-type domestic firm never offers α, which results in a lower payoff than
Πk, i.e. Π
S
k (α, a(α)) ≥ Πk if sk(α) > 0. Assuming that, in equilibrium, the
domestic firm makes the offer α and sL(α) + sH(α) > 0, the following three
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cases must be distinguished according to whether:
(i) a(α) = 0
If (i) then ΠSk = Πk; however, in equilibrium, pi
S
L > ΠL must hold, so sL(α) = 0.
Only the high-type domestic firm makes the offer. Thus, the payoff to the low-
type foreign firm when it rejects the offer is Π
∗
HL. As a(α) = 0, αΠ
M < Π
∗
HL and
ΠM > ΠHL + Π
∗
HL, so Π
M > αΠM + ΠHL. As a result, (1−α)ΠM > ΠHL > ΠH ;
now ΠSk ≥ Πk is settled in this sub-case.
(ii) aH(α) = 0 but aL(α) > 0
If (ii), then only the low-type foreign firm accepts the offer in which αΠM = Π
∗
kL;
the payoff to the k-type domestic firm when making the offer is:
ΠSk (α, a(α)) = ηLaL(1− α)ΠM + ηL(1− aL)ΠkL + ηHΠkH
= ηLaL
(
ΠM − ΠkL − Π∗kL
)
+ ηLΠkL + ηHΠkH
= Πk + ηLaL
(
ΠM − ΠkL − Π∗kL
)
> Πk
Now ΠSk ≥ Πk is settled in sub-case (ii).
(iii) aH(α) > 0 and aL(α) = 1
If (iii), then only the high-type foreign firm rejects the offer αΠM = Π
∗
kH . Thus,
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the payoff to the k-type domestic firm when making this offer is:
ΠSk (α, a(α)) = ηL(1− α)ΠM + ηHaH(1− α)ΠM + ηH(1− aH)ΠkH
= Πk + ηHaH(Π
M − ΠkH − Π∗kH) + ηL(ΠM − ΠkL − Π∗kH)
As long as ΠM > ΠkL + Π
∗
kH , it guarantees that Π
S
k ≥ Πk is settled in this
sub-case (iii).
Proof of Proposition 2
When the domestic firm offers αLΠ
M = Π
∗
L to the foreign firm, only the low-
type foreign firm accepts, whereas the high-type certainly rejects it or a(αL) ≤
ηL. Therefore, the payoff to the k-type domestic firm is:
ΠSk (αL, a(αL) ≤ ηL) = a(αL)ηL(ΠM − Π∗L) + (1− a(αL))ηLΠkL + ηHΠkH
= a(αL)ηL(Π
M − Π∗L − ΠkL) + Πk
On the contrary, if the domestic firm offers αHΠ
M = Π
∗
H , the foreign firm
will accept this offer with certainty or a(αH) = 1. Hence, the payoff to the
k-type domestic firm is:
ΠSk (αH , a(αL) = 1) = Π
M − Π∗H
Given the best-response of the foreign firm, the expected payoff to the low-
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type domestic firm when offers αL is:
ΠSL(αL, a(αL) ≤ ηL) = a(αL)ηL(ΠM − Π∗L − ΠLL) + ΠL
Since ΠM > Π
∗
LL + ΠLL and Π
∗
L < Π
∗
LL, the result is Π
M −Π∗L −ΠLL > 0. This
guarantees that the low-type domestic firm does not deviate from αL to α < αL.
Moreover, the low-type domestic firm has no incentive to offer αH rather
than αL if the following condition holds:
ΠM − Π∗H ≤ a(αL)ηL(ΠM − Π∗L − ΠLL) + ΠL
or:
a(αL) ≥
(
ΠM − Π∗H − ΠL
ΠM − Π∗L − ΠLL
)
The expected payoff to the high-type domestic firm if it offers αL is:
ΠSH(αL, a(αL) ≤ ηL) = a(αL)ηL(ΠM − Π∗L − ΠHL) + ΠH
If ΠM > Π
∗
L + ΠHL holds, the high-type domestic firm does not deviate from αL
to α < αL. Otherwise it does.
The high type domestic firm does not deviate to αH , if, and only if,:
ΠM − Π∗H ≤ a(αL)ηL(ΠM − Π∗L − ΠHL) + ΠH
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or:
a(αL) ≥
(
ΠM − Π∗H − ΠH
ΠM − Π∗L − ΠHL
)
Since
(
ΠM−Π∗H−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L−ΠLL
)
≥
(
ΠM−Π∗H−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗L−ΠHL
)
, then if condition (a) ΠM > Π
∗
L+ΠHL and
(b) a(αL) ≥
(
ΠM−Π∗H−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L−ΠLL
)
hold, there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the
domestic firm offers αL and the foreign firm accepts this offer with probability
a(αL) ≤ ηL. On the contrary, if a condition a(αL) ≤
(
ΠM−Π∗H−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗L−ΠHL
)
holds, there
exists a pooling equilibrium, which the domestic firm offers αH and the foreign
firm accepts with certainty.
Proof of Proposition 3
When a pure separating strategy is applied, the different types of domestic
firms choose to make a different offer. If the high-type domestic firm offers
αHLΠ
M = Π
∗
HL, only the low-type foreign firm will accept this offer. Then, if the
low-type foreign firm accepts the offer αHL with probability aL(αHL), the offer
αHL will be accepted by the foreign firm with probability a(αHL) = ηLaL(αHL).
The expected payoff to the high-type domestic firm when offering αHL is:
ΠSH(αHL, a(αHL)) = ηLaL(αHL)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL
)
+ ηL(1− aL(αHL))ΠHL + ηHΠHH
= ηLaL(αHL)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠHL
)
+ ΠH
Since ΠSH(αHL, a(αHL)) > ΠH , the high-type domestic firm has no incentive to
offer α < αHL which the foreign firm will certainly reject.
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On the other hand, if the offer αLHΠ
M = Π
∗
LH is made, the foreign firm will
accept it with certainty. Therefore, the high-type domestic firm will not deviate
from offering αHL if the following condition holds:
ΠM − Π∗LH ≤ ηLaL(αHL)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠHL
)
+ ΠH
or:
a(αHL) ≥
(
ΠM − Π∗LH − ΠH
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠHL
)
As long as above condition holds, offering αHL, which the foreign firm accepts
with probability a(αHL), is the high-type domestic firm’s best-response.
When the low-type domestic firm chooses to offer αLHΠ
M = Π
∗
LH , which the
foreign firm will certainly accept it, the expected payoff to the low-type domestic
firm is:
ΠSL(αLH , 1) = Π
M − Π∗LH
If sub-case (iii) in Lemma 2 holds, ΠSL(αLH) = Π
M − Π∗LH > ΠLL > ΠL. The
low-type domestic firm will not offer any terms α < αHL, which is certainly
rejected by the foreign firm.
Whether the low-type domestic firm mimics the high-type domestic firm by
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offering αHL. If it does, its expected payoff will be:
ΠSL(αHL, a(αHL)) = ηLaL(αHL)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL
)
+ ηL(1− aL(αHL))ΠLL + ηHΠLH
= ηLaL(αHL)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠLL
)
+ ΠL
The low-type domestic firm will not mimic the high-type domestic firm if the
following condition is satisfied:
ΠM − Π∗LH ≥ ηLaL(αHL)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠLL
)
+ ΠL
or:
a(αHL) ≤
(
ΠM − Π∗LH − ΠL
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠLL
)
If a condition
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
≤ a(αHL) ≤
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠLL
)
holds, there
exists at least one equilibrium where the domestic firm will reveal its own type
truthfully. The low-type domestic firm will offer αLH , which the foreign firm will
certainly accept it and the high-type domestic firm will offer αHL, which will
be accepted with probability a(αHL). This result implies that if the domestic
firm adopts a pure separating strategy, the bargaining failure will occur with a
positive probability.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the case in which the high-type domestic firm employs a mixed
strategy. Assume that the high-type domestic firm offers αˆ with probability β
and α´ < αˆ with probability 1− β, whereas the low-type domestic firm offers αˆ
with certainty. By updating the belief in accordance with the Bayes’ rule, the
foreign firm accepts the offer αˆΠM = Π
∗
H(αˆ) > Π
∗
H with certainty and the offer
α´ΠM = Π
∗
HL with probability a(α´) ≤ ηL.
The expected payoff to the high-type domestic firm, when it offers αˆ with
probability β and α´ with probability 1− β, is:
ΠSH(sH(αˆ) = β, sH(α´) = 1− β) = ΠH + β
(
ΠM − Π∗H(αˆ)− ΠH
)
+ a(α´)(1− β)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠHL
)
If a condition ΠM > Π
∗
H(αˆ)+ΠH holds, the high-type domestic firm prefers this
mixed strategy rather than taking risk on the final result. Moreover, the high-
type domestic firm will not deviate to a pure pooling strategy, or sH(αˆ) = 1,
if:
ΠM − Π∗H(αˆ) ≤ ΠH + β
(
ΠM − Π∗H(αˆ)− ΠH
)
+ a(α´)(1− β)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠHL
)
or:
a(α´) ≥
(
ΠM − Π∗H(αˆ)− ΠH
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠHL
)
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Similarly, it has no incentive to employ a pure separating strategy where sH(α´) =
1, if the following condition holds:
ΠH + a(α´)(Π
M − Π∗HL + ΠHL) ≤ ΠH + β
(
ΠM − Π∗H(αˆ)− ΠH
)
+ a(α´)(1− β)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠHL
)
or:
a(α´) ≤
(
ΠM − Π∗H(αˆ)− ΠH
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠHL
)
Therefore, if (a) ΠM > Π
∗
H(αˆ) + ΠH and (b) a(α´) =
(
ΠM−Π∗H(αˆ)−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
hold, this
mixed strategy is preferable to the high-type domestic firm.
The expected payoff to the low-type domestic firm, when it certainly offer αˆ,
is equal to:
ΠSL(sL(αˆ) = 1) = Π
M − Π∗H(αˆ)
Since Π
∗
H(αˆ) < Π
∗
LH and ΠL < ΠLL, then if sub-case (iii) in Lemma 2 holds, the
low-type domestic firm prefers settling the private agreement to taking the final
result. Furthermore, it will not deviate from αˆ to α´ as long as:
a(α´)
(
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠLL
)
+ ΠL ≤ ΠM − Π∗H(αˆ)
or:
a(α´) ≤
(
ΠM − Π∗H(αˆ)− ΠL
ΠM − Π∗HL − ΠLL
)
Since
(
ΠM−Π∗H(αˆ)−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠLL
)
>
(
ΠM−Π∗H(αˆ)−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
, so if (a) ΠM > Π
∗
H(αˆ) + ΠH and
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(b) a(α´) =
(
ΠM−Π∗H(αˆ)−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
are satisfied, neither the high-type nor the low-type
domestic firm deviate from this strategy. A type I semi-separating equilibrium,
where the high-type firm adopts a mixed strategy, is established.
Due to Π
∗
LH > Π
∗
H(αˆ) then
(
ΠM−Π∗H(αˆ)−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
>
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠH
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠHL
)
. The exis-
tence of a separating equilibrium in Proposition 3 is sufficient to guarantee that
the type I semi-separating equilibrium will exist. This result implies that the
private agreement will fail to be settled with a positive probability.
Proof of Proposition 5
When the low-type domestic firm adopts a mixed strategy, a semi-separating
equilibrium may exist. Assume that the low-type firm offers α˜ with probability
λ and α` > α˜ with probability 1−λ, but the high-type domestic firm offers α˜ with
probability one. The foreign firm updates its belief in accordance with Bayes’
rules; therefore, if the offer α˜ΠM = Π
∗
L(α˜) < Π
∗
L is made, the foreign firm will
accept with probability a(α˜) ≤ ηL. On the contrary, if the offer α`ΠM = Π∗LH is
made, none of the foreign firms will reject it.
The expected payoff to the low-type domestic firm, when it offers α˜ with
probability λ and α` with probability 1− λ, can be shown as:
ΠSL(sL(α˜) = λ, sL(α`) = 1− λ) = ΠL + a(α˜)λ
(
ΠM − Π∗L(α˜)− ΠLL
)
+ (1− λ)
(
ΠM − Π∗LH − ΠL
)
Since Π
∗
L(α˜) < Π
∗
LL and ΠLL > ΠL, then if sub-case (iii) in Lemma 2 holds, the
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low-type domestic firm prefers to settle the private agreement. Similarly, it will
not deviate to a pure pooling strategy, or sL(α˜) = 1, if:
ΠL + a(α˜)
(
ΠM − Π∗L(α˜)− ΠLL
)
≤ ΠL + a(α˜)λ
(
ΠM − Π∗L(α˜)− ΠLL
)
+ (1− λ)
(
ΠM − Π∗LH − ΠL
)
or:
a(α˜) ≤
(
ΠM − Π∗LH − ΠL
ΠM − Π∗L(α˜)− ΠLL
)
In addition, the low-type domestic firm will not deviate from this mixed strategy
to a pure separating strategy, or sL(α`) = 1, when:
ΠM − Π∗LH ≤ ΠL + a(α˜)λ
(
ΠM − Π∗L(α˜)− ΠLL
)
+ (1− λ)
(
ΠM − Π∗LH − ΠL
)
or:
a(α˜) ≥
(
ΠM − Π∗LH − ΠL
ΠM − Π∗L(α˜)− ΠLL
)
Hence, the low-type domestic firm prefers to employ this mixed strategy when
a condition a(α˜) =
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L(α˜)−ΠLL
)
is satisfied.
When the high-type domestic firm offers α˜ with certainty, its expected payoff
is defined as:
ΠSH(sH(α˜) = 1) = ΠH + a(α˜)
(
ΠM − Π∗L(α˜)− ΠHL
)
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As long as ΠM > Π
∗
L + ΠHL holds, the high-type domestic firm prefers es-
tablishing the private agreement rather than taking risk on the final outcome.
Moreover, it has no incentive to offer α` instead of α˜ if the following condition is
satisfied:
ΠM − Π∗LH ≤ ΠH + a(α˜)
(
ΠM − Π∗L(α˜)− ΠHL
)
or:
a(α˜) ≥
(
ΠM − Π∗LH − ΠH
ΠM − Π∗L(α˜)− ΠHL
)
A type II semi-separating equilibrium exists when ΠM > Π
∗
L + ΠHL and
a(α˜) =
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L(α˜)−ΠLL
)
are satisfied. Since
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗HL−ΠLL
)
<
(
ΠM−Π∗LH−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L(α˜)−ΠLL
)
<(
ΠM−Π∗H−ΠL
ΠM−Π∗L−ΠLL
)
, the existence of a separating equilibrium in Proposition 3 or a
pooling equilibrium in Proposition 2 cannot guarantee the existence of the type
II semi-separating equilibrium.
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Chapter 3: Do the Rules of Origin
make a difference?
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Abstract
The larger growing number of FTAs during these two decades has motivated
a policy debate on the effects of FTAs on preferential trade and patterns of trade.
This paper examines the behaviour of firms after the implementation of an FTA
by paying attention to the impacts of rules of origin on preferential trade flows
and economic activities within the FTA region. It is found that a tightening
of the rules of origin increases the volume of final goods import from RoW but
decreases the volume of intermediate goods and raw material import from RoW,
given the dominance of the final goods rules of origin effects. However, if the
intermediate goods rules of origin effects dominate, the volume of intermediate
goods import from RoW turns to increase, rather than decrease. These imply
that preferential trade flows and economic activities among the member coun-
tries of an FTA may increase or decrease when the rules of origin are tightened.
The findings, inter alia, suggest that the product-specific rules of origin that
impose the restrictive rules to final goods but the loose rules to intermediate
goods are more efficient in promoting preferential trade and economic activities
within the region and also inducing investments from outside.
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1 Introduction
The proliferation of Free Trade Agreements during the past two decades has
spawned a discussion over the implications of FTAs on preferential trade flow
and economic integration among the members, especially the impacts of rules
of origin. Rules of Origin consist of mechanisms and schemes specifying condi-
tions for goods to gain a preferential treatment under the FTAs. They are a
central market-access tool governing over the preferential trade and the pattern
of economic activities within FTA region.
According to Duttagupta and Panagariya (2007), in the presence of the rules
of origin, the joint welfare of the FTA members may be inferior to the status
quo.1 However, the rules of origin could make the FTAs politically more ac-
ceptable. This paper, therefore, treats the formation of an FTA as given and
limits an attention to the impacts of a restrictiveness of the rules of origin on
preferential trade flows among the member countries.
This paper is motivated by the question do the more restrictive rules of origin
really increase preferential trade flows and promote economic activities within
the FTA region? as argued by policy makers. Based on the concept of content
1The classic analysis of the welfare impacts of an FTA is that of Viner (1950), who es-
tablished the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation is one in which
a member country imports more from its lower-cost FTA partner to replace its own higher
cost domestic production; results in a gain of welfare. On the contrary, trade diversion occurs
when a member country switches its import from an efficient nonmember to a less efficient
member because of the FTA’s tariff preferences; causes a loss of welfare. An FTA will improve
the joint welfare of its members if the benefits of trade creation dominate the losses from
trade diversion. The bigger the trade volume diverted from the RoW is, the more likely that
the joint welfare of the FTA members decreases, then rules of origin may negatively affect on
welfare.
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protection schemes,2 Krishna and Krueger (1995), Falvey and Reed (1998) and
Ju and Krishna (2005) argue that the more restrictive rules of origin either
decrease or increase trade flows within the region, depending on the degree of
competition in the final goods and the intermediate goods sectors on which they
are applied. The more restrictive rules of origin may not result in an increasing
in preferential trade flows among member countries as expected.
This paper extends the model of Ju and Krishna (2005) by introducing the
intermediate goods rules of origin to examine the behaviour of firms when the
degree of restrictiveness of rules of origin is changed, in attempt to answer the
following questions: Firstly, do the more restrictive rules of origin increase pref-
erential trade flows and promote activities within the FTA region? Secondly,
what type of rules of origin should be employed? Thirdly, what should the de-
gree of restrictiveness of the rules of origin be? Finally, should preferential rules
of origin be harmonised?
In a homogeneous regime that all firms choose to produce the originating
goods, the more restrictive rules of origin decrease final goods trade flows but
increase intermediate goods and raw material trade flows within the FTA region
if the final goods rules of origin effects are dominant. This is consistent with
Ju and Krishna (2005) and empirical results of Estervadeordal and Suominen
(2003)3 and Cadot, Estervadeordal and Akiko (2005).4 However, if the interme-
2Such as Grossman (1981), Hollander (1987) and Mussa (1984).
3A negative relation between the rules of origin restriction and the trade flow between the
FTA members.
4The more restrictive rules of origin cause the less preferential import within the NAFTA.
109
diate goods rules of origin effects are dominant, the more restrictive the rules of
origin are, intermediate goods trade flows within the region are more likely to
decrease, rather than increase as predicted by Ju and Krishna (2005).
If the objectives of establishing the FTA are to promote preferential trade
flows and economic activities within the region and induce new investments
from outside, the final goods rules of origin should be tightened whereas the
intermediate goods rules of origin should be loosened. In contrast, if a member
country is not ready to open its final goods market and would like to limit
preferential market access, it has to tighten both the final goods and intermediate
goods rules of origin.
These suggest that the product-specific rules of origin are preferable to the
general rules. The product-specific rules specify a specific criterion to each
product and vary from product to product, while the general rules set a single
criterion to all product lines. Therefore, the product-specific rules are more flex-
ible and a more efficient device because these can assign a different requirement
to different products in response to the different characteristics and sensitivity
of each industry.
Last but not least, the growing number of overlapping FTAs, whose rules
of origin substantially differ from agreement to agreement and from country to
country, has spun a complex web of rules of origin. Thus, the administrative
costs and the burden for manufacturers to comply with the rules of origin are
higher. Harmonisation of preferential rules of origin is purposed to solve these
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problems. In my point of view, however, a variation across preferential rules of
origin is preferable to harmonised rules of origin because the main objective of
rules of origin is to be an efficient device to reach the country’s objectives in
establishing the FTA, not being the simple rule.
This paper is organised as follow. The following section reviews related
literature about the relationship among the rules of origin, the behaviour of
firms and the change in the trade volume from the Rest of the World, hereafter
called RoW. In Section 3, an extended model of Ju and Krishna (2005) by
introducing a production of intermediate goods to examine the behaviour of
firms when the implementation of an FTA with rules of origin. The effects of
degree of restrictiveness of rules of origin on preferential trade flows within the
FTA region are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses what the rules of
origin should be. Finally, the conclusion is presented in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
Much of the literature on the impacts of Rules of Origin on the preferential trade
flows and the pattern of economic activities among the FTA parties is based
on the concept of content protection and content preference. Both schemes
require a given percentage of domestic value added, or domestic component to
be embodied in a final goods. A content protection program is a combination
between tariff protection for the intermediate goods and subsidy to the final
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goods producer. Similarly, a content preference scheme acts like a foreign subsidy
to final goods producers in the exportable industry, and may or may not provide
protection to the domestic intermediate goods producers.
Grossman (1981) investigates the effects of content protection and content
preference schemes on resource reallocation. His results show that if domestic
and foreign inputs are perfect substitutes, producers will revert from foreign
inputs to domestics ones, then the domestic intermediate inputs price and pro-
duction costs increase. The excess of the domestic intermediate inputs price over
the world price depends on the substitutability between domestic and foreign
intermediate inputs, the supply condition in the domestic intermediate inputs
industry and the market structure of those inputs. However a content preference
scheme may cause a decrease in the outputs of the exportable industry if the
requirement is binding.
Dixit and Grossman (1982) employ a multistage protection model to analyse
the effects of factor accumulation and protection on resource allocation. They
find that the final goods producers have an incentive to produce upstream goods
domestically rather than to import them from outside. The content protection
leads to an expansion in intermediate activities. Lloyd (1993) extends this model
to the FTA with rules of origin and finds similar results to Grossman (1991). The
formation of an FTA with rules of origin causes a trade creation of intermediate
input, and it eliminates the overlap in the range of goods produced by the
FTA members. Rodriguez (2001) argues that the restrictive rules of origin may
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lead to the inefficiency of product reallocation within the FTA region. This
is consistent with Kruger (1999), the NAFTA with rules of origin causes the
Mexican producers to shift their purchase from the lower cost sources outside to
the higher cost sources inside the region.
Ju and Krishna (2005) examine the effects of rules of origin on the behaviour
of firms and market access from RoW. Their results suggest that when the
restrictive rules of origin increases, imports of final goods from RoW first increase
and then decrease whereas imports of intermediate goods from RoW first fall
and then rise. The more restrictive the rules of origin are, it is more likely that
the domestic producers lower imports of intermediate goods from RoW, because
rules of origin require higher domestic contents to be embodied. However, if rules
of origin are too restrictive, the domestic producers give up to comply with them
so they switch back to choose the intermediate goods from the cheapest sources,
consequently an increasing in imports of intermediate goods from RoW.
Just because, the rules of origin seem to be protective, it does not mean they
are. Appiah (1999) applies a multi-sector Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) model to analyse the NAFTA effects and finds that the rules of origin
distort trade flows, divert resources from the most efficient users and undercut
global welfare. Estevadeordal (2000) examines the relationship between the
preferential tariff phase-outs and the accompanying rules of origin. His estimated
results suggest that rules of origin are used to prevent trade deflection, as the
sectors that have the larger differences in the tariff are those where rules of origin
113
are more restrictive. Beside, that protection and the extent of rules of origin are
positively correlated.
With respect to Estervadeordal and Suominen (2003), they incorporate vir-
tually all rules of origin regimes around the world and employ a gravity model
to study the effects of rules of origin on trade flows. Their results show that
the restrictiveness rules of origin negatively and significantly affects trade flows
between countries as suggested by theoretical studies. Secondly, the restrictive-
ness and complexity of rules of origin have an adverse effect on aggregate trade
flows. Finally, the more restrictiveness of final goods rules of origin results in
the larger trade in intermediate goods within the region.
Cadot et al (2005) re-examine the effects of rules of origin on trade flows
by employing a restrictiveness index, as conducted by Estervadeordal and the
gravity model on cross section data. As predicted by theoretical works, they
find a negative relation between the restrictiveness rules of origin and trade
flows between members. Furthermore, Cadot, Estervadeordal and Akiko (2005)
conduct an empirical study of the NAFTA rules of origin impacts on preferential
trade within the region, their results suggest that the more restrictive are rules
of origin, the more negative are the impacts on preferential trade flows.
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3 The Model
The model of Ju and Krishna (2005) is modified here to analyse the behaviour
of firms and preferential trade flow within the FTA region in the presence of
final goods and intermediate goods rules of origin. Rather assuming that an
originating intermediate goods is exogenously determined, this assumption is
relaxed now. Intermediate goods firms can employ either a raw material within
the region or from RoW to produce an intermediate goods. However, an in-
termediate goods produced by firms within the FTA region can be counted as
originating content only if it meets the intermediate goods rules of origin.
Assume that the world consists of country A, B, and C; country A and B
form an FTA, excluding C which can be considered as RoW and both of them
are sufficiently large for ensuring that both members are welfare improving.5
There are three kinds of goods, a final goods (x), an intermediate goods (y),
and a raw material (z), in addition to a numeraire consumption good. Let B
has a comparative advantage in the final goods relative to A, but not relative
to RoW and A has a comparative advantage to the intermediate goods relative
to B, but not relative to RoW.6
5According to Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos (2004), the formation of an FTA results
in two opposing effects on member countries. On one hand, their terms of trade vis-a-vis
RoW decline and this is welfare-decreasing. On the other hand, the internal liberalisation
causes trade expansion among the members and this is welfare-increasing. The latter effect
will dominate and the formation of an FTA will improve welfare for member countries if, and
only if, member countries are sufficiently large.
6A trade diversion in the final goods from ROW to B improves the welfare in B but reduces
the welfare in A. At the same time, the intermediate goods and raw material relocation from
RoW to A causes the welfare improvement in A and let the welfare losses from a trade diversion
in A be not larger than the welfare gains from expansion of trade in the intermediate goods.
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Define pwj as the world price of goods j when j ∈ {x, y, z} then the price of
goods j in country i ∈ {A,B} before forming the FTA is equal to pi0j = (1+tij)pwj
where tij is imported tariff of goods j in country i. Assume throughout this
paper that the tariff rates of final goods in A are higher than in B, but the tariff
rates of intermediate goods and raw material in A are lower than B. That is
tAx > t
B
x , t
A
y < t
B
y and t
A
z < t
B
z .
After establishing the FTA, A and B eliminate their imported tariff to each
other’s goods. However, prices in A and B are different because a simple trans-
shipment cannot occur in the presence of the rules of origin. The raw material
rules of origin here are assumed to be very restrictive and prohibitively expensive
to comply, the price of raw material from RoW in A and B is pA1z∗ = (1 + t
A
z )p
w
z
and pB1z∗ = (1+t
B
z )p
w
z respectively, and these prices are not equalised. In contrast,
the regional raw material in both countries has the same price, p1z where p
1
z ≥
pB1z∗ > p
A1
z∗ .
7 Although the price p1z is higher than the price of raw material
from RoW, the FTA intermediate goods firm may still choose it because it can
contribute to originating cost share whereas the raw material from RoW cannot.
Country A can import the final goods from either C or B with zero tariff on
condition that such goods meets the origin requirements. The final goods price
in A after the FTA will never be higher than the price before the FTA. That is
pB0x∗ ≤ pA1x ≤ pA0x∗ . Since the final goods price in B is initially lower than A, the
final goods firm in A has no incentive to comply with the origin requirements
7Defines pj as the price of originating goods j and pj∗ as the price of goods j from RoW.
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and export to B. The final goods price in B remains unchanged, pB0x∗ = p
B1
x∗ .
What happens to the intermediate goods market in country A and B after
forming the FTA? In the presence of the rules of origin, the intermediate goods
produces within the FTA region and meets the requirements, hereafter called
originating intermediate goods, and the intermediate goods from RoW are phys-
ically indifferent but they differ in the sense that the former can contribute to
the cost share that the final goods rules require, while the latter cannot. There
is a trade diverting in the intermediate goods from RoW to the preferential re-
gional market. A higher demand for originating intermediate goods increases its
price and this price is always higher that the price of intermediate goods from
RoW. That is p1y ≥ pB1y∗ > pA1y∗ .
A Final Goods Firm Behaviour
Let F iX(Y, k) be a constant return to scale production function of final goods in
country i where i ∈ {A,B}, k is a capital used in which treated as given in a
short run and Y is the intermediate goods used by a firm to produce the final
goods, which can either be the originating intermediate goods (y) or intermediate
goods from RoW (y∗).8
A final goods firm in country A has no incentive to comply with the origin
requirements and export to B because the final goods price there is lower. The
8This also refers to the intermediate goods produced within the FTA region but fails to
meet the origin requirements or imported from outside.
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final goods firm in A will choose the intermediate goods from the cheapest
sources to produce the final goods for its own market. The final goods supply
of a typical firm in A after the FTA can be written as:
sAx∗(p
A1
x ,min(p
1
y, p
A1
y∗ ))
At the same time, a final goods firm in country B decides to comply the origin
requirements and export the originating final goods to A with price pA1x or ig-
nore them and sell its products domestically with price pB0x∗ where p
B0
x∗ < p
A1
x ,
depending on which choice is more profitable. If the former choice is more prof-
itable, all firms will choose to produce the originating goods. This refers to a
Homogeneous Regime. In contrast, If there is indifferent between the former
and the latter choice, some firms will choose to produce the originating goods
whereas others will not. This refers to a Heterogeneous Regime.
Assume that rules of origin require at least α percent of the originating cost
share to the total variable costs. That is:
p1yy
p1yy + p
B1
y∗ y
∗ ≥ α
If the price of originating intermediate goods is not higher than the price of
intermediate goods from RoW in B, p1y ≤ pB1y∗ , all final goods firms in B will
choose the originating intermediate goods and will automatically comply with
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the origin requirements. The rules of origin do not affect the behaviour of final
goods firms in B. On the contrary, at p1y > p
B1
y∗ , the final goods firms are forced
to use the originating intermediate goods at least α percent if they would like
to sell their products with price pA1x in A.
With p1y > p
B1
y∗ , the more the originating intermediate goods is used, the
higher extra production costs the final goods firms face. The firms reasonably
chooses to meet the origin requirement at exactly level, then:
y∗ =
p1y(1− α)
αpB1y∗
y
The quantity of intermediate goods used to produce the originating final goods
is:
Y = y + y∗ =
{
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
αpB1y∗
}
y
Therefore, the cost of intermediate goods used is equal to:
p1yy + p
B1
y∗ y
∗ = p1yy + p
B1
y∗
{
p1y(1− α)
αpB1y∗
y
}
=
p1y
α
y
=
{
p1yp
B1
y∗
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
}
(y + y∗)
Denote ϕ(α, p1y) =
p1yp
B1
y∗
p1y(1−α)+αpB1y∗
as a variable cost of producing the final goods
when the rules of origin are met.
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A demand for the originating intermediate goods of a typical firm can be
shown as:
yB(pA1x , p
1
y, α) = φ(α, p
1
y)Y
B(pA1x , ϕ(α, p
1
y))
Where φ(α, p1y) =
αpB1
y∗
p1y(1−α)+αpB1y∗
or
yB(pA1x ,p
1
y ,α)
Y B(pA1x ,ϕ(α,p
1
y))
. This can be interpreted as a
share of originating intermediate goods used to total intermediate goods used.
Lemma 1 (i)
∂ϕ(α,p1y)
∂α
> 0, (ii)
∂ϕ(α,p1y)
∂p1y
> 0, (iii)
∂φ(α,p1y)
∂α
> 0 and
(iv)
∂φ(α,p1y)
∂p1y
< 0
Proof. See Appendix.
The more restrictive the final goods rules of origin are, the more the origi-
nating intermediate goods is required. As a result, an increase in the demand
for the originating intermediate goods, the price of the originating intermediate
goods and then the production cost of the originating final goods. Hence, the
product cost of the originating goods is an increasing function of the restrictive
final goods rules of origin and the price of the originating intermediate goods as
specified in (i) and (ii) respectively.
When the final goods rules of origin are tightened, the share of the quantity
of originating intermediate goods used increases as a result of the originating
intermediate goods being more required. In contrast, if the price of the orig-
inating intermediate goods increases, the final goods producers need less the
originating intermediate goods to meet the requirements. Therefore, the share
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of the quantity of originating intermediate goods used is an increasing function
of the restrictive rules of origin but a decreasing function of the price of the
originating intermediate goods as specified in (iii) and (iv) respectively.
A profit function of the final goods firms that produce the originating final
goods in B is:
ΠBx (p
A1
x , p
B1
x∗ , ϕ(α, p
1
y), p
B1
y∗ ) = p
A1
x F
B
X (Y, k)− ϕ(α, p1y)Y − k (1)
On the contrary, if the firms choose to sell its products domestically, it is rea-
sonable that they ignore the origin requirements and employs the intermediate
goods from RoW, which price is lower, pB1y∗ < p
1
y, to produce the final goods.
Since country B can import the final goods and the intermediate goods from
RoW at price pB1x∗ and p
B1
y∗ respectively. Thus, a profit function of the final goods
firm that choose to not comply with the final goods rules of origin is fixed at:
Π
B
x∗(p
B1
x∗ , p
B1
y∗ ) = p
B1
x∗ F
B
X (y
∗, k)− pB1y∗ y∗ − k (2)
All final goods firms in country B will produce the originating final goods
and export under the preferential treatments with price pA1x to A if this choice
is more profitable, or ΠBx (p
A1
x , p
B1
x∗ , ϕ(α, p
1
y), p
B1
y∗ ) > Π
B
x∗(p
B1
x∗ , p
B1
y∗ ). This is knon
as the homogeneous regime. According to Lemma 1, the production cost of the
originating final goods increases when the final goods rules origin are tighten,
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the more restrictive rules of origin lead to a decrease in the profit for producing
the originating goods. At α = α∗ where α∗ is the smallest value of α such
that ΠBx (p
A1
x , p
B1
x∗ , ϕ(α, p
1
y), p
B1
y∗ ) = Π
B
x∗(p
B1
x∗ , p
B1
y∗ ), some final goods firms in B
switch back to supply for their own domestic market. This is known as the
heterogeneous regime.
An Intermediate Goods Firm Behaviour
Assume that a production function of intermediate goods in country i, F iY (Z, k)
is a constant return to scale. Z is the raw material used to produce the inter-
mediate goods, which can either be the originating raw material (z) or the raw
material (z∗) from RoW. The originating intermediate goods, not only gains
preferential treatment when exported to another member but that goods can
contribute to the originating cost share. Therefore, after the FTA, the price
of the originating intermediate goods and raw material are equalised across the
member countries and higher than the price of these goods from RoW.
Let the intermediate goods rules of origin require the originating raw material
cost share at least β percent of the total variable cost, or:
p1zz
p1zz + p
i1
z∗z
∗ ≥ β where i ∈ {A,B}
This paper allows the originating intermediate goods to be produced by using a
combination of regional raw material and raw material from RoW. However, if
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the originating intermediate goods price falls to be equal to the imported price,
none of the intermediate goods firms complies with the rules of origin.
Since the price of regional raw material is higher than the price of raw mate-
rial from RoW; therefore, the intermediate goods firm will employ the regional
raw material only at exactly level β requires. The cost of raw material used can
be written as:
p1zz + p
i1
z∗z
∗ =
{
p1zp
i1
z∗
p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗
}
(z + z∗)
Denote γi(β, p1z) =
p1zp
i1
z∗
p1z(1−β)+βpi1z∗
as a variable cost of producting the intermediate
goods when the rules of origin are met in country i.
A demand for the regional raw material of a typical intermediate goods firm
that produces the originating intermediate goods in country i is:
zi(p1y, β, p
1
z) = η
i(β, p1z)Z(p
1
y, γ
i(β, p1z))
Where ηi(β, p1z) =
βpi1
z∗
p1z(1−β)+βpi1z∗
or
zi(p1y ,β,p
1
z)
Z(p1y ,γ
i(β,p1z))
. This is a share of originating raw
material used to to total raw material used.
Lemma 2 (i) ∂γ
i(β,p1z)
∂β
> 0, (ii) ∂γ
i(β,p1z)
∂p1z
> 0, (iii) ∂η
i(β,p1z)
∂β
> 0 and
(iv) ∂η
i(β,p1z)
∂p1z
< 0
Proof. See Appendix.
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Similar to Lemma 1, the tightening of the intermediate goods rules of ori-
gin leads to the more the regional raw material is required. As a result, an
increasing in the price of the regional raw material, the share of the quantity of
regional raw material used and the production cost of the originating interme-
diate goods. As the price of the regional raw material increases, the production
cost of the originating intermediate goods increases but the quantity of regional
raw material used decreases.
According to an assumption that tBz > t
A
z , the cost of producing the origi-
nating intermediate goods between a firm in A and B are different. This finding
suggests that a competitiveness of domestic industry can be improved by reduc-
tion or elimination the external tariff of upstream materials.9
A profit function of the intermediate goods firms in country i that produce
the originating intermediate goods is equal to:
Πiy(p
1
y, p
i1
y∗, γ
i(β, p1z), p
i1
z∗) = p
1
yF
i
Y (Z, k)− γi(β, p1z)Z − k (3)
A profit for producing the intermediate goods is an increasing function of the
originating intermediate goods price, p1y, but a decreasing function of the re-
gional raw material price, p1z. In contrast, if the intermediate goods firms supply
their goods domestically, these firms will not need to comply with the origin
9If a member country reduces its external tariff, not only its competitiveness is improved
but the terms of trade and welfare of nonmember countries are also improved as suggested by
Bond et al (2004).
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requirement. Therefore, only the cheaper raw material from RoW is used. A
profit function of the intermediate goods firms in country i that chooses to not
comply the intermediate goods rules of origin is constant as:
Π
i
y∗(p
i1
y∗ , p
i1
z∗) = p
i1
y∗F
i
Y (z
∗, k)− pi1z∗z∗ − k (4)
All intermediate goods firm will produce the originating intermediate goods
to sell this goods in B if this choice is more profitable. In other word, a con-
dition Πiy(p
1
y, p
i1
y∗, γ
i(β, p1z), p
i1
z∗) > Π
i
y∗(p
i1
y∗ , p
i1
z∗) holds. This is the homogeneous
regime. Referring to Lemma 2, the tightening the intermediate goods rules
of origin causes a decrease in the profits for producing the originating inter-
mediate goods. At β = β∗B where β
∗
B is the smallest value of β such that
ΠBy (p
1
y, p
B1
y∗ , γ
B(β, p1z), p
B1
z∗ ) = Π
B
y∗(p
B1
y∗ , p
B1
z∗ ), some intermediate goods firms in B
choose to not comply with the intermediate goods rules of origin and sell their
product at the same price as the intermediate goods from RoW.10 This is the
heterogeneous regime.
10At β = β∗A where Π
i
y(p
1
y, p
A1
y∗ , γ
A(β, p1z), p
A1
z∗ ) = Π
A
y∗(p
A1
y∗ , p
A1
z∗ ) and β
∗
A > β
∗
B , only some
intermediate goods firm A produces the originating intermediate goods while none of inter-
mediate goods firms in B does.
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4 The Results
This section will present the impacts of the restrictiveness of the rules of origin on
preferential trade flows among the FTA members. The net change in preferential
trade flows within the region can be captured by a change in the volume of import
from RoW. If country A trade is diverted from RoW to country B, there is a
drop in the volume of import from RoW. In other word, the more preferential
trade flows among the member countries are, the more the volume of import
from RoW drops.
In the absence of the rules of origin, establishing the FTA causes a large
change in trade flows within the region. The nonmember countries export their
products to a member country that has the lowest imported duties, and circulate
such products to other member countries with free duties. The price in other
member countries will fall and converge to the price in the member country that
has the lowest import duties. Hence, the volume of import from Row increases
and the external imported duties of the member countries will converge to zero.
In the presence of the rules of origin, results are different. The more re-
strictive rules of origin is expected to increase preferential trade flows among
the member countries. The findings show that the high degree of restrictiveness
of the rules of origin does not guarantee more preferential trade flows within
the region. In contrast, it either increases or decreases preferential trade flows,
depending on the degree of competition among the final goods, the intermediate
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goods and the raw material sectors on which they are applied and whether the
final goods or the intermediate goods rules of origin effects dominate.
The tightening of the rules of origin decreases final goods trade flows but
increases intermediate goods and raw material trade flows, given the dominance
of the final goods rules of origin effects. On the contrary, if the intermediate
goods rules of origin effects dominate, the more restrictive rules of origin reduce
final goods and intermediate goods trade flows while improve raw material trade
flows.
Above results suggest that if the member countries aim to promote preferen-
tial trade and economic activities among themselves and induce the investments
from outside, the final goods rules of origin should be tightened whereas the
intermediate goods rules of origin should be softened. If the intermediate goods
rules of origin are tightened as well as the final goods rules of origin, the prefer-
ential trade flows of final goods and intermediate goods tend to decrease, rather
than increase as argued by policy makers.
The rest of the section, the restrictiveness of rules of origin impacts on a
change in the volume of import from RoW, in which implies the preferential
trade flows within the FTA region, are presented in detail.
A Change in The Volume of Final Goods Import
The impacts of the FTA with rules of origin on the final goods preferential trade
flows can be studied via a change in the volume of final goods import from
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RoW, between, before and after implementing the FTA. Now let consider the
final goods demand and supply in A and B
Since the final goods price in B remains unchanged, so the demand for the
final goods in B is not affected, or:
DBX(p
B1
x∗ ) = D
B
X(p
B0
x∗ )
The higher final goods price in A encourages the final goods firms inB to produce
more the originating final goods and export under the preferential treatment
to A; causes a decrease in the final goods price in A. However, if the final
goods price in A falls to pB0x∗ , none of the final goods firms in B export the
originating final goods to A. At the same time, country A can import the final
goods from RoW at price pA0x∗ ; therefore, the originating final goods in A will be
pB0x∗ ≤ pA1x ≤ pA0x∗ .
For simplification, assume that the originating final goods from B is not
sufficient to meet the whole demand in A. The final goods price and demand in
A remain unchanged,11 then:
DAX(p
A1
x∗ ) = D
A
X(p
A0
x∗ )
11On the contrary, if then final goods firms in B can supply all originating final goods
demands from A, the final goods price in A falls to below p1x and the final goods demand rises
to DAX(p
A1
x ) > D
B
X(p
A0
x∗ ).
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The final goods price in B is lower than the price in A, which is assumed to
be unchanged. Then none of the final goods firms in A choose to produce the
originating final goods and the final goods supply in A remains unchanged, or:
SAX(p
A1
x , p
A1
y∗ ) = N
A
Xs
A
x∗(p
A1
x , p
A1
y∗ )
Where NAX is the fixed number of final goods firms in country A.
12
While the formation of the FTA affects neither the final goods demand in
A and B nor the final goods supply in A, it directly affects on the final goods
supply in B. With pB1y∗ < p
1
y < p˜y(α
∗),13 all final goods firms in B produce the
originating final goods and export to A. Their supply increases with the price
of the originating final goods but decreases with the price of the originating
intermediate goods. Under the homogeneous regime, the final goods supply in
B can be written as:
SBX(p
A1
x , p
B1
x∗ , ϕ(.), p
B1
y∗ ) = N
B
Xs
B
x (p
A1
x , ϕ(.))
If the price of the originating intermediate goods increases to p1y = p˜y(α
∗),
some final goods firms in B produce the originating final goods while others do
12N iJ= n
i
j + n
i
j∗ where i ∈ {A,B}, J ∈ {X,Y } and j, j∗ indicate originating and non-
originating goods j respectively.
13Where p˜y(α) is the originating intermediate goods price in which makes the final goods
firms in B are indifferent between exporting the originating final goods to A and selling their
products in domestic market with the same price as the final goods from RoW.
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not.14 Under the heterogeneous regime, the final goods supply in B is:
SBX(p
A1
x , p
B1
x∗ , ϕ(.), p
B1
y∗ ) = n
B
x s
B
x (p
A1
x , ϕ(.)) + n
B
x∗s
B
x∗(p
B1
x∗ , p
B1
y∗ )
Now a change in the volume of final goods import from RoW can be shown
as:
V Ix∗ =
{
DAX(p
A1
x )−DAX(pA0x∗
}
+
{
DBX(p
B1
x∗ )−DBX(pB0x∗ )
}
− {NAXsAx∗(pA1x , pA1y∗ )−NAXsAX(pA0x∗ , pA0y∗ )}
− {sBx (pA1x , ϕ(.))− sBx (pB0x∗ , pB0y∗ )}nBx
− {sBx∗(pB1x∗ , pB1y∗ )− sBx∗(pB0x∗ , pB0y∗ )}nBx∗
(5)
Only the final goods supply in B is affected by the FTA. Therefore, the impacts
of the restrictiveness of the final goods rules of origin on the change in the volume
of final goods imported from RoW can be examined by differentiating the final
goods supply in B with respecting to the final goods rules of origin, or
∂SBX
∂α
.
For the homogeneous regime, all final goods firm in B choose to produce
and export the originating final goods, the tightening of the final goods rules of
origin causes a decrease in the final goods supply in B. Therefore, the volume
of final goods import from RoW increases with the restrictiveness of the final
14In contrast, if p1y > p˜y(α
∗), none of the final goods firms in B produces the originating
final goods; therefore, the final goods supply in B is the same as before forming an FTA, or:
SBX(p
B0
x∗ , p
B0
y∗ ) = S
B
X(p
B1
x∗ , p
B1
y∗ )
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goods rules of origin. On the contrary, if some final goods firms in B produce
the originating final goods whereas the others do not, the heterogeneous regime,
the result is different. The more restrictive final goods rules of origin increases
the number of firms that choose not to produce the originating final goods and
reduces the price of the originating intermediate goods. As a result, the final
goods supply in B increases when the rules of origin are tightened. These results
are consistent with Ju and Krishna (2005).
Proposition 1 If rules of origin are not binding, the formation of an FTA
reduces the volume of final goods import from RoW. If rules of origin are bind-
ing, a tightening of the final goods rules of origin increases the volume of final
goods import from RoW under the homogeneous regime but decreases it under
the heterogeneous regime.
Proof. See Appendix.
As already mentioned, a drop in the volume of imports from RoW implies
an increase in preferential trade flows among the member countries. Hence,
Proposition 1 implies that the higher the degree of restrictiveness of the final
goods rules of origin is, the more likely that the preferential trade flows of final
goods among the member countries decrease.
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A Change in The Volume of Intermediate Goods Import
Now let consider a change in the volume of intermediate goods import from
RoW when the FTA with rules of origin is implemented. Since the final goods
supply in A remains unchanged, so the derived demand for the intermediate
goods from RoW in A does not change and only the intermediate goods from
RoW is used. The intermediate goods demand in A is:
DAy∗(p
A1
x , p
A1
y∗ ) = D
A
Y (p
A0
x∗ , p
A0
y∗ )
The higher price of the originating final goods in A increases the derived
demand for the intermediate goods by the final goods firms in B as a result of
an increase in the originating final goods supply. In the presence of the final
goods rules of origin, the originating intermediate goods must be embodied in
the final goods; hence, the demand for the intermediate goods in B can be
written as:
DBY (p
1
y(α), p
B1
y∗ , p
1
x, p
B1
x∗ ) = n
B
x
[
yB(p1y(α), p
1
x) + y
∗B(pB1y∗ )
]
+ nBx∗y
∗B(pB1y∗ )
Lemma 3 The demand for the originating intermediate goods is an increasing
function of the restrictiveness of the final goods rules of origin, α, when ϕ <
1
λ
where λ =
α(p1y−pB1y∗ )
p1y
< 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
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On the one hand, the final goods rules of origin increases the originating
intermediate goods price and then the originating intermediate goods supply in
A and B. On the other hand, the intermediate goods rules of origin decrease
the originating intermediate goods supply in both countries because the origin
requirements raise the production cost. The intermediate goods supply in i can
be written as:
SiY = n
i
ys
i
y(p
1
y, γ
i(p1z, β)) + n
i
y∗s
i
y∗(p
i1
y∗ , p
i1
z∗)
If p1z < p˜
B
z (β
∗
B), where p˜
B
z (β
∗
B) is the regional raw material price that makes
the intermediate goods firms in B earn the indifferent profit between complying
and not complying with the intermediate goods rules of origin, or β < β∗B, all
intermediate goods firms in both A and B produce the originating intermediate
goods to sell in B. That is the homogeneous regime.
When p1z = p˜
B
z (β
∗
B), or β
∗
B ≤ β < β∗A, all intermediate goods firms in A and
only some intermediate goods firms in B produce the originating intermediate
goods. If p1z = p˜
A
z (β
∗
A) where p˜
A
z (β
∗
A) > p˜
B
z (β
∗
B), or β ≥ β∗A, only some interme-
diate goods firms in A produce the originating intermediate goods choice but
none of the intermediate goods firms in B produce that. These latter two cases
represent as the heterogeneous regime. Since the price of the originating inter-
mediate goods and the regional raw material play a crucial role to determine the
demand and supply for the intermediate goods. Therefore, the rules of origin
impacts on the price of the originating intermediate goods and the regional raw
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material are necessarily examined. The tightening of the rules of origin increases
the demand for the oginating intermediate goods and the regional raw material
and so do the price of them. In other word,
∂p1y
∂α
> 0 and ∂p
1
z
∂β
> 0.
However, if the rules of origin are too restrictive, the tightening of the rules
of origin has an inverse result. It would be too costly to comply with the rules
of origin. As a result, the demand and the price of the originating intermediate
goods and the regional raw material fall.
Lemma 4 (i) ∂p˜y
∂α
< 0, (ii) ∂p˜z
∂β
< 0
Proof. See Appendix.
A change in the volume of intermediate goods import from RoW is:
V Iy∗ =
{
DAy∗(p
A1
x , p
A1
y∗ )−DAY (pA0x∗ , pA0y∗ )
}
+
{
nBx
[
yB(pA1x , ϕ(.)) + y
∗B(pB1y∗ )
]
+ nBx∗y
∗B(pB1y∗ )−DBY (pB0x∗ , pB0y∗ )
}
− {nAy sAy (p1y, γA(.)) + nAy∗sAy∗(pA1y∗ , pA1z∗ )−NAY sAY (pA0y∗ , pA0z∗ )}
− {nBy sBy (p1y, γB(.)) + nBy∗sBy∗(pB1y∗ , pB1z∗ )−NBY sBY (pB0y∗ , pB0z∗ )}
(6)
The restrictiveness of the rules of origin effects on the change in the volume of
intermediate goods import from RoW can be classified into 4 cases as follows:
Firstly, at α < α∗ and β < β∗B, all firms produce the originating goods. That
is the homogeneous regime. The tightening of the rules of origin increases the
price of the originating intermediate goods and the regional raw material. There
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are two opposite effects on the volume of intermediate goods import from RoW.
On the one hand, the supply of the originating intermediate goods increases
because of an increase in its own price. On the other hand, the supply of the
originating intermediate goods decreases due to an increase in its input price.
Hence, the tightening of the rules of origin decreases the volume of intermedi-
ate goods import from RoW, given that the final goods rules of origin effects
dominant. On the contrary, if the intermediate goods rules of origin effects
dominate, the tightening of the rules origin improves the volume of intermediate
goods import from RoW.
Secondly, at α ≥ α∗ and β < β∗B, some final goods firms in B produce the
originating final goods and all intermediate goods firms produce the originating
intermediate goods. That is the heterogeneous regime in the final goods but
the homogeneous regime in the intermediate goods. When rules of origin are
tightened, the demand for the intermediate goods increase because some of the
final goods firms in B switch to produce products for their domestic market.
At the same time, the supply for the intermediate goods decreases because of
a decrease in its own price and the higher cost of production. Therefore, the
volume of intermediate goods import from RoW improves as the rule of origin
are more restrictive.
Thirdly, at α < α∗ and β∗B ≤ β ≤ β∗A, all final goods firms in B produce
the originating final goods and some of the intermediate goods firms produce
the originating intermediate goods. That is the homogeneous regime in the
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final goods but the heterogeneous regime in the intermediate goods. The more
restrictive the rules of origin are, the more likely that the volume of intermediate
goods import from RoW decreases. Since the demand for the intermediate goods
decrease whereas the supply for the intermediate goods increases when the rules
of origin are tightened.
Finally, at α ≥ α∗ and β∗B ≤ β ≤ β∗A, only some firms produce the origi-
nating goods. That is the heterogeneous regime. The tightening of the rules of
origin causes firms change to produce more products for their domestic market
regardless of the rules of origin. As a result, the demand and supply for the in-
termediate goods increase. The volume of intermediate goods import from RoW
increases as the restrictiveness of rules of origin increases, given the dominance
of the final goods rules of origin effects but it decreases if the intermediate goods
rules of origin effects dominate.
Proposition 2 A tightening of the rules of origin improves (reduces) the vol-
ume of the intermediate goods import from RoW under the homogeneous regime
but reduces (improves) it under the heterogeneous regime if the intermediate (fi-
nal) goods rules of origin effects dominate.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that the tightening of the rules of origin either im-
proves or reduces intermediate goods trade flows among the member countries,
depending on whether the final goods or the intermediate goods rules of origin
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effects dominate. The restrictiveness of the final goods rules of origin has a
positive impact on intermediate goods trade flows but the restrictiveness of the
intermediate goods rules of origin has a negative impact.
A Change in The Volume of Raw Material Import
In the presence of the rules of origin, the higher price of the originating inter-
mediate goods in B increases the derived demand for the regional raw material.
The demand for the raw material in country i can be written as:
DiZ(p
1
z(β), p
i1
z∗ , p
1
y(α), p
i1
y∗) = n
i
y
[
zi(p1z(β), p
1
y(α)) + z
∗i(pi1z∗)
]
+ niy∗z
∗i(pi1z∗)
Lemma 5 The demand for the regional raw material rises as the intermediate
goods rules of origin are tightened if γ <
1
κ
where κ =
β(p1z−pi1z∗ )
p1z
< 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Assume that the raw material is a natural resource or primary product and
cannot be produced from imported raw material. In other words, a wholly
obtained requirement. The supply of raw material in i is solely determined by
its own price. Since the price of the regional raw material is higher than the
price of the raw material from RoW; the supply of the raw material in i after
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the FTA will not be less than the supply of the raw material before the FTA.
Siz(p
1
z) ≥ Siz(pi0z )
A change in the volume of raw material import from RoW can be defined as:
V Iz∗ =
{
nAy
[
zA(p1y, p
1
z) + z
∗A(pA1z∗ )
]
+ nAy∗z
∗A(pA1z∗ )−NAY ZA(pA0y∗ , pA0z∗ )
}
+
{
nBy
[
zB(p1y, p
1
z)) + z
∗B(pB1z∗ )
]
+ nBy∗z
∗B(pB1z∗ )−NBY ZB(pB0y∗ , pB0z∗ )
}
− {SAz (p1z)− SAz (pA0z∗ )}− {SBz (p1z)− SBz (pB0z∗ )}
(7)
For the homogeneous regime, the tightening of the intermediate goods rules
of origin increases the demand for the regional raw material but decreases the
demand for the raw material. At the same time, the supply of the regional raw
material increases as a result of an increase in the regional raw material price.
Hence, as the restrictiveness of the intermediate goods rules of origin increases,
the volume of raw material import from RoW is more likely to reduce.
For the heterogeneous regime, on the contrary, the price of the regional raw
material decreases as the intermediate goods rules of origin are tightened. The
supply of the regional raw material falls while the demand for the raw material
increases because of a switching from producing the originating intermediate
goods to the other. Thus, the volume of raw material import from RoW im-
proves as the intermediate goods rules of origin are tightened.
Proposition 3 A tightening of the intermediate goods rules of origin reduces
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the volume of raw material import from RoW under the homogeneous regime
but improves it under the heterogeneous regime.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition implies that the restrictiveness of the rules of origin pos-
itively affects on the preferential trade flows of raw material among the FTA
members. An increases in the restrictiveness of the intermediate goods rules of
origin causes a rising in raw material trade flows.
5 What the Rules of Origin should be
The main objectives of the FTAs are to promote trade liberalisation among
the member countries, enlarge the market and increase economic integration
among themselves. Rules of Origin are intentionally designed to prevent trade
deflection,15 a failure to satisfy the rules, disqualifies the products for preferential
tariff treatment. The rules of origin have been considered as a central market-
access tool governing over the preferential trade within the FTA region.
This section examines what rules of origin can encourage preferential trade
flows, promote economic integration within the region and attract the invest-
ments from outside. The following issues are discussed: whether the general
rules of origin or the product-specific rules of origin should be employed; what
15Refer to import from the nonmember countries into the member country with the lowest
most favoured tariffs for trans-shipment to other member countries.
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the degree of rules of origin restrictiveness should be. And finally, should rules
of origin be harmonised.
Either General Rules Or Product-Specific Rules
Which is the more efficient device to prevent trade deflection and encourage
preferential trade flows among the member countries, the general rules of origin
or the product-specific rules of origin? The general rules of origin refer to a single
criteria applied to all products. For example, AFTA16 rules of origin require at
least 40 percent of the regional value content, this requirement is applied to all
kinds of product from canned tuna, apparel, electronic products and parts to
automobiles and parts. On the other hand, the product-specific rules of origin
that specify a specific criteria to each product, vary from product to product.
For example, NAFTA17 rules of origin where require a change in chapter (CC)
for a ceramic product, a change in tariff sub-heading (CTSH) and at least 50
percent of regional content for an automobile.
The general rules are simple and easy to negotiate but it lacks flexibility and
efficiency to serve the FTA objectives. When a single requirement is applied to
all products, it does not mean that all products face the same degree of rules of
origin restrictiveness. For example, the automotive rule of origin in AFTA is less
restrictive than the garment and apparel rule of origin even though both require
16Asean Free Trade Area founded in 1993; members of this agreement are Bruni Darussalam,
Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet
Nam.
17North America Free Trade Agreement founded 1994.
140
at least 40 percent of regional content. The ASEAN automotive industry has no
trouble complying with 40 percent regional content because it is a high value-
added industry, and ASEAN countries are the world’s leading manufacturers of
automotive parts and components.
On the contrary, the ASEAN garment and apparel industry finds it is hard
to comply with the 40 percent requirement even though ASEAN countries are
a major garment and apparel manufacturer. Since the garment and apparel
industry is a low value-added industry, and ASEAN countries do not have enough
raw material, they have to import cotton and synthetic fiber, which are the
upstream inputs from outside. The 40 percent regional content requirement
may be the efficient tool to prevent trade deflection, promote preferential trade
among the member countries, and attract the investments from outside for one
industry, but it may become a trade barrier of another.
The product-specific rules that allow a rule to vary from product to product,
on the one hand, are complex and take a long time to negotiate. On the other
hand, these are more flexible and efficient than the general rules. A country can
design the rules of origin to be compatible with its comparative advantage and
its objectives.
For example, if a member of the FTA would like to promote preferential
trade flows and economic activities in automotive sector, the more restrictive
rules of origin for automobiles and the less restrictive rules of origin for parts
and components are needed. The tightening of the downstream-product rules
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of origin induce the more preferential trade of originating inputs whereas the
softening of the upstream-input rules of origin places fewer burdens on upstream
producers, and attracts the investments from outside. In contrast, if a country
would like to protect its automotive sector, the tightening of the automobile
rules of origin is not sufficient, rules of origin for parts and component must also
be tightened.
The product-specific rules of origin are more effective device to promote
preferential trade and economic activities within the region or even protect the
domestic industries because each industry has different characteristics and sen-
sitivity. The general rules of origin are simple and straightforward but lack
flexibility to serve the objectives of the FTA. Recently, almost all the preferen-
tial rules of origin are the product-specific rules, whereas some regimes such as
COMESA18 and AFTA that employed the general rules have been initiatives to
renegotiate for the product-specific rules of origin.
Either Tight Rules Or Loose Rules
The weak and non-binding rules of origin encourage more preferential trade flows
within the FTA region. However, the regional industries may not fully benefit
from this because the weak and non-binding rules cannot prevent trade deflection
and circumvention. While the loose rules succeed to promote preferential trade
flows within the region, they cannot guarantee that all benefits will only occur
18Common Market for Eastern and South Africa founded in 1994.
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to the member countries and they may fail to promote economic activities and
economic integration among the FTA members.
Nevertheless, the tightening of the rules of origin requires more originating
inputs to be embodied, but it guarantees neither more trade flows nor more
economic integration among the member countries. In the presence of the very
tight rules of origin, firms choose export their products under non-preferential
treatment because it is too costly to comply with rules of origin.
According to the findings, the restrictive final goods rules of origin will induce
more preferential trade among the member countries only if the intermediate
goods rules of origin are loose. A loosening of the intermediate goods rules of
origin could reduce the complying costs; as a result, an increase in producing the
downstream products and the upstream inputs. On the contrary, if a country
would like to protect its domestic industries, the tightening of the final goods
and the intermediate goods rules of origin is needed. The tightening only the
final goods rules of origin may be insufficient to protect the domestic market
from other FTA members if the loose intermediate goods rules of origin are
applied.
Harmonisation of Preferential Rules of Origin
Recently, the number of FTAs notified to the WTO, about 500 and all member
countries of WTO, with the exception of Mongolia, have been participating in at
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least one FTA.19 An important issue of an increasing in the number of the FTAs
is the growing number of overlapping agreements, the spaghetti-bowl.20 The
larger number of overlapping FTAs has spun a complex web of rules of origin; a
manufacturing process that complies with origin requirement of one particular
FTA, may fail to comply with origin requirement of other FTAs. This causes an
increase in administrative costs and is more difficult for production planners.
In order to achieve significant benefits in terms of lower administrative costs
and a more efficient implementation, should the preferential rules of origin be
harmonised? It seems rational to harmonise the preferential rules of origin be-
cause it would help to promote transparency and trade facilitation, reduce ad-
ministrative costs and most importantly decrease the burden on manufacturers
to comply with the rules of origin for many FTAs.
However, each country-pair has concerns in different industries and has differ-
ent comparative advantages,21 a single set of rules of origin cannot take account
for the difference that varies from country-pairs to country-pairs.
The question now arises, what would a country like the rules of origin to be?
If a country would like the simple set of rules of origin with the low administrative
19As of 15 January 2012, 511 agreements were notified to WTO and 319 agreements were
already in force. Source: WTO, Regional Trade Agreement Database.
20For example, Thailand is now party to 10 FTAs: AFTA, ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand,
ASEAN-China, ASEAN-India, ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-Korea, Thailand-Australia, Thailand-
Japan, Thailand-Laos and Thailand-New Zealand. At the same time Japan is party
to 13 FTAs: ASEAN-Japan, Japan-Bruni Darussalam, Japan-Chile, Japan-India, Japan-
Indonesia, Japan-Malaysia, Japan-Mexico, Japan-Peru, Japan-Philippines, Japan-Singapore
Japan-Switzerland, Japan-Thailand and Japan-Viet Nam.
21For example Japan may not concern with opening a processed chicken market to Bruni
Darussalam, but may concern to open it to Thailand; therefore, the rules of origin between
these should be different.
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costs, harmonising the preferential rules of origin is a good alternative. If a
country would like the rules of origin that are compatible with its comparative
advantage and its sensitivity, the rules of origin regimes that vary across the
preferential agreements are a more interesting and attractive choice. In my
point of view, the main purpose of rules of origin is to be a device to reach the
objectives of the FTA; therefore, a variation across rules of origin regimes is
preferable to harmonised rules of origin.
6 Conclusion
This paper extended the model of Ju and Krishna (2005) by allowing a pro-
duction of intermediate goods and a variation in rules of origin. In other word,
intermediate goods rules of origin (β) are introduced into the model and these
rules are not necessary to have the same degree of restrictiveness of the final
goods rules of origin (α). This model is then used to examine the behaviour of
firms when the FTA with rules of origin is implemented and the rules of origin
impacts on a change in the volume of import from RoW and preferential trade
flows among the member countries.
The results show that, with the dominance of final goods rules of origin ef-
fects, the tightening of the rules of origin improves the volume of final goods
import from RoW but reduces the volume of intermediate goods and raw mate-
rial import from RoW for the homogeneous regime. This is consistent with Ju
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and Krishna (2005) and the empirical studies by Estervadeordal and Suominen
(2003) and Cadot et al (2005). However, for the heterogeneous regime, when the
rules of origin are tightened, the volume of final goods import from RoW drops
while the volume of intermediate goods and raw material from RoW improve.
On the contrary, if the intermediate goods rules of origin effects dominate,
the tightening of the rules of origin increases the volume of final goods and inter-
mediate goods import from RoW whereas decreases the volume of raw material
import from RoW for the homogeneous regime. If there is in the heterogeneous
regime, the result is opposite. The volume of final goods and intermediate goods
import from RoW fall but the volume of raw material import from RoW rises.
These findings implies that the more restrictive rules of origin do not guar-
antee more preferential trade flows and economic integration among the mem-
ber countries. They can either increase or decrease trade flows within the FTA
region, depending on the degree of competition among the final goods, the inter-
mediate goods and the raw material sectors on which they are applied, whether
the final goods or the intermediate goods rules of origin effects dominate and
whether the upstream-input industries are comparative advantage or compara-
tive disadvantage compared to RoW.
If the member countries aim to promote preferential trade, economic activ-
ities and economic integration among themselves and attract new investments
from outside, the tightening of the final goods rules of origin but a loosening
of the intermediate goods rules of origin are needed. In other word, the high
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value of α and the low value of β. If a member country would like to protect
its final goods industry, it has to negotiate for the restrictive final goods and its
upstream inputs rules of origin.
For these reasons, the product-specific rules of origin are preferable to the
general rules of origin since they are more flexible and efficient device in reach-
ing the FTA objectives. With the product-specific rules of origin, the member
countries can design an origin requirement to be compatible with a sensitivity
and characteristic of each product.
Recently, the preferential rules of origin are substantially different from agree-
ment to agreement and from country to country. The proliferation of overlap-
ping FTAs has caused the higher administrative costs and the higher burdens
on manufacturers to complying with the rules of origin for many FTAs. Should
the preferential rules of origin be harmonised in order to solve such problems?
Generally, the main purposes of rules of origin are to prevent trade deflection
and promote preferential trade and economic integration among the member
countries, rather than being the simple rules. Therefore, a variation across pref-
erential rules of origin regimes is preferable to a harmonisation of preferential
rules of origin.
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Appendix
Proof Lemma 1
(i)
∂ϕ(α,p1y)
∂α
> 0
A production cost when rules of origin are met is ϕ(α, p1y) =
p1yp
B1
y∗
p1y(1−α)+αpB1y∗
. When
α increases, p1y(1 − α) + αpB1y∗ decreases, thereby there is a positive relation
between ϕ(α, p1y) and α.
(ii)
∂ϕ(α,p1y)
∂p1y
> 0
Divide both numerator and denominator in ϕ(.) by p1y, and get:
ϕ(α, p1y) =
pB1y∗
p1y(1−α)+αpB1y∗
p1y
A rising in α causes a falling in
p1y(1−α)+αpB1y∗
p1y
then α positively affects on ϕ(α, p1y).
(iii)
∂φ(α,p1y)
∂α
> 0
Divide both numerator and denominator of φ(α, p1y) =
αpB1
y∗
p1y(1−α)+αpB1y∗
by αpB1y∗ ,
yields:
φ(α, p1y) =
1
p1y(1−α)
αpB1
y∗
+ 1
As α increases,
p1y(1−α)
αpB1
y∗
decreases, then φ(α, p1y) increases.
(iv)
∂φ(α,p1y)
∂p1y
< 0
When α rises, the denominator of φ(α, p1y), p
1
y(1− α) + αpB1y∗ increases then
φ(α, p1y) falls.
148
Proof Lemma 2
(i) ∂γ
i(β,p1z)
∂β
> 0
A cost of producing the intermediate goods when complying with rules of origin
is γi(β, p1z) =
p1zp
i1
z∗
p1z(1−β)+βpi1z∗
, if β increases, the denominator term, p1z(1−β)+βpi1z∗ ,
decreases, so γi(β, p1z) is an increasing function of β.
(ii) ∂γ
i(β,p1z)
∂p1z
> 0
Divide both numerator and denominator of γi(β, p1z) by p
1
z, and get:
γi(β, p1z) =
pi1z∗
p1z(1−β)+βpi1z∗
p1z
A rising in p1z results in a falling in
p1z(1−β)+βpi1z∗
p1z
then γi(β, p1z) is an increasing
function of p1z.
(iii) ∂η
i(β,p1z)
∂β
> 0
Divide the numerator and denominator of ηi(β, p1z) by βp
i1
z∗ , provides:
ηi(β, p1z) =
1
p1z(1−β)
βpi1
z∗
+ 1
Therefore, an increasing in p1z causes a rising in η
i(β, p1z) because when p
1
z in-
creases; the term p
1
z(1−β)
βpi1
z∗
decreases.
(iv) ∂η
i(β,p1z)
∂p1z
< 0
As p1z increases, the denominator of η
i(β, p1z), p
1
z(1− β) + βpi1z∗ rises, so ηi(β, p1z)
is a decreasing function of p1z.
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Proof Proposition 1
When rules of origin are not binding, i.e. α < αˆ, the rules do not affect on
the originating intermediate goods price, p1y = p
B1
y∗ . All final goods firms in B
automatically meet the origin requirements without bearing any extra complying
costs. Therefore, with a higher final goods price in A, the final goods firms in
B supply more final goods to A, the volume of final goods import from RoW
drops.
If the final goods rules are binding but not exceed α∗, i.e. αˆ ≤ α < α∗,
all final goods firms in B produce the originating final goods. In other word,
a homogeneous regime. The effects of the degree of restrictiveness on the final
goods supply in B can be shown as:
∂SBX(.)
∂α
= NBx
{
∂sBx (.)
∂ϕ(.)
∂ϕ(.)
∂α
}
According to Lemma 1, ∂ϕ(.)
∂α
> 0, and ∂s
B
x
∂ϕ
< 0, then ∂S
B
x
∂α
< 0. The more
restrictive the final goods rules of origin are, the more likely that the final goods
supply in B decreases. Hence, the tightening of the final goods rules of origin
increases the volume of final goods import from RoW for the homogeneous
regime.
In contrast, if the final goods rules of origin are very tight, i.e. α ≥ α∗, some
final good firms in B switch back to produce the final goods for the domestic
market. That is a heterogeneous regime. Now the tightening of the final goods
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rules of origin effects on the final goods supply in B can be written as:
∂SBX(.)
∂α
=
∂
∂α
{
nBx s
B
x (p
A1
x , ϕ(p˜y, α)) + n
B
x∗s
B
x∗(p
B1
x∗ , p
B1
y∗ )
}
=
∂nBx
∂α
sBx (.) + n
B
x
∂sBx (.)
∂ϕ(.)
∂ϕ(.)
∂p˜y
∂p˜y
∂α
− ∂n
B
x
∂α
sBx∗(p
B1
x∗ , p
B1
y∗ )
=
∂nBx
∂α
[
sBx (p
A1
x , ϕ(.))− sBx∗(pB1x∗ , pB1y∗ )
]
+ nBx
∂sBx (.)
∂ϕ(.)
∂ϕ(.)
∂p˜y
∂p˜y
∂α
An increase in α reduces the number of firms who produce the originating final
goods, ∂n
B
x
∂α
< 0, in order to equate demand and supply. The outputs of firms
who comply with rules of origin are less than the outputs of those who do not,[
sBx (p
A1
x , ϕ(.))− sBx∗(pB1x∗ , pB1y∗ )
]
< 0; therefore, the first term is positive. Due
to ∂p˜y
∂α
< 0 (detail show in proof of Lemma 3), and ∂s
B
x
∂ϕ
< 0, the second term
is also positive. For the heterogeneous regime, an increase in the degree of
restrictiveness improves the final goods supply in B. As a result, the volume of
final goods import from RoW falls.
Proof Lemma 3
The originating intermediate goods demand of a firm is defined as:
y(pA1x , p
1
y, α) = φ(α, p
1
y)Y (p
A1
x , ϕ(α, p
1
y))
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Differentiate y with respect to α yields:
∂y(p1y, α)
∂α
=
∂φ(.)
∂α
Y (.) + φ(.)
∂Y (.)
∂ϕ
∂ϕ
∂α
=
p1yp
B1
y∗
(p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗ )2
Y (.) +
αpB1y∗
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
∂Y (.)
∂ϕ
p1yp
B1
y∗ (p
1
y − pB1y∗ )(
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
)2
=
ϕ(.)Y (.)
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
+
ϕ(.)
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
∂Y (.)
∂ϕ
αpB1y∗ (p
1
y − pB1y∗ )
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
p1y
p1y
=
ϕ(.)Y (.)
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
{
1 +
ϕ(.)
Y (.)
∂Y (.)
∂ϕ
α(p1y − pB1y∗ )
p1y
}
=
ϕ(.)Y (.)
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
(1− ϕλ) > 0 if ϕ < 1
λ
Where λ =
α(p1y−pB1y∗ )
p1y
< 1.
The originating intermediate goods demand is an increasing function of the
restriction of the final goods rules of origin, α, when ϕ <
1
λ
.
Proof Lemma 4
(i) ∂p˜y
∂α
< 0
A production cost, when the final goods rules of origin are met, is:
ϕ(α, p1y) =
p1yp
B1
y∗
p1y(1− α) + αpB1y∗
With implicit differentiation when p1y = p˜y:
∂p˜y
∂α
= −
[
∂ϕ(.)/∂α
∂ϕ(.)/∂p1y
]
With respect to Lemma 1,
∂ϕ(α,p1y)
∂α
> 0 and
∂ϕ(α,p1y)
∂p1y
> 0, then ∂p˜y
∂α
< 0. For the
152
heterogeneous regime, the tightening of the final goods rules of origin causes a
falling in the originating intermediate goods price.
(ii) ∂p˜
i
z
∂β
< 0
A production cost when the intermediate goods rules of origin are met is:
γi(β, p1z) =
p1zp
i1
z∗
p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗
With implicit differentiation when p1z = p˜
i
z:
∂p˜iz
∂β
= −
[
∂γi(.)/∂β
∂γ(.)/∂p1z
]
According to Lemma 2, ∂γ
i(.)
∂β
> 0, and ∂γ
i(.)
∂p1z
> 0, then ∂p˜
i
z
∂β
< 0. The restric-
tiveness of the intermediate goods rules of origin has a negative effect on the
regional raw material for the heterogeneous regime.
Proof Proposition 2
For the homogeneous regime in the final goods, or α < α∗
An increase in the level of α leads to the following results, given that ϕ < 1/λ:
(i)
∂y(p1y ,α)
∂α
> 0 as shown in Lemma 3
(ii)
∂p1y
∂α
> 0
The final goods rules of origin impacts on the originating intermediate goods
price can be written as:
∂p1y
∂α
= −
[
∂y(.)/∂α
∂y(.)/∂p1y
]
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Due to y(.) = φ(.)Y (.) and Y (.) =
p1y(1−α)+αpB1y∗
p1y(1−α) y
∗, then:
∂y(.)
∂p1y
=
∂φ(.)
∂p1y
Y + φ(.)
∂Y
∂p1y
With respect to Lemma 1, ∂φ(.)
∂p1y
< 0 and ∂Y (.)
∂p1y
= − αpB1y∗
p1y(1−α) < 0, then
∂y(.)
∂p1y
< 0.
The originating intermediate goods price increases with the level of α.
(iii) ∂Y (.)
∂α
< 0
The tightening of the final goods rules affects on the intermediate goods demand
as:
∂Y (.)
∂α
=
∂Y (.)
∂p1y
∂p1y
∂α
As shown in (ii),
∂p1y
∂α
> 0 and ∂Y (.)
∂p1y
< 0, then ∂Y (.)
∂α
< 0. The tightening of the
final goods rules of origin causes a decrease in the intermediate goods demand.
For the heterogeneous regime in the final goods, or α ≥ α∗
The strengthening of the final goods rules of origin provides:
(iv) ∂p˜y(α)
∂α
< 0 as shown in Lemma 4
(v) ∂Y (.)
∂α
> 0 when p1y = p˜y
With Envelope theorem:
∂Y (.)
∂α
=
∂Y (.)
∂p1y
∂p1y
∂α
At p1y = p˜y,
∂Y (.)
∂p1y
< 0 and ∂p˜y
∂α
< 0 as shown in Lemma 4, then ∂Y (.)
∂α
> 0. An
increase in the degree of restrictiveness causes a rising in the demand for the
intermediate goods.
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For the homogeneous regime in the intermediate goods, or β < β∗B
When the intermediate goods rules of origin are tightened, it yields:
(vi)
∂SY (p
1
y ,γ(β,p
1
z))
∂β
< 0
The effects of the intermediate goods rules of origin on the intermediate goods
supply can be shown as:
∂SY (p
1
y, γ(β, p
1
z))
∂β
=
[
∂sy(p
1
y, γ(β, p
1
z))
∂β
]
NY
=
[
∂sy(.)
∂γ
∂γ
∂p1z
∂p1z
∂β
]
NY
Due to ∂sy(.)
∂γ
< 0, ∂γ
∂p1z
> 0 as shown in Lemma 2 and ∂p
1
z
∂β
> 0 as shown in (iii),
then
∂sy(p1y ,γ(β,p
1
z))
∂β
< 0. The tightening of the intermediate goods rules of origin
decreases the intermediate goods supply.
For the heterogeneous regime in the intermediate goods, or β ≥ β∗B
A rising in the degree of restrictiveness of the intermediate goods rules of origin
results in:
(vii)
∂SY (p
1
y ,p
1
z)
∂β
> 0
When the intermediate goods rules of origin are strengthened, the intermediate
goods supply is affected by:
∂SY (p
1
y, p
1
z)
∂β
=
∂ny
∂β
(sy − sy∗) + ny ∂sy
∂β
The strengthening of the intermediate goods rules of origin reduces the number of
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firms who produce the originating intermediate goods in order to equate demand
and supply. That is ∂ny
∂β
< 0. The outputs of firms who comply with the rules of
origin are always less than the outputs of those who do not. Therefore, the first
term is positive. At p1z = p˜z,
∂sy
∂β
> 0, so the second term is also positive. For
these reasons, The tightening of the intermediate goods rules of origin increases
the intermediate goods supply when there is in the heterogeneous regime.
Given (i)-(vii), the tightening of the rules of origin decreases the demand and
supply of the intermediate goods in the homogeneous regime but increase in the
heterogeneous regime. Therefore,
(1) For the homogeneous regimes in both goods, the volume of intermediate
goods import from RoW drops if the final goods rules effects dominate. However,
it improves if the intermediate goods rules effects dominate.
(2) For the heterogeneous regime in the final goods but the homogeneous
regime in the intermediate goods, the volume of intermediate goods import from
RoW increases.
(3) For the homogeneous regime in the final goods but the heterogeneous
regime in the intermediate goods, the volume of intermediate goods import from
RoW falls.
(4) For the heterogeneous regime in both goods, the volume of intermedi-
ate goods import from RoW increases if the final goods rules effect dominate.
Nevertheless, it decreases if the intermediate goods rules effects dominant.
156
Proof Lemma 5
The originating intermediate goods demand of a firm in country i is:
zi(p1z, p
1
y, β) = η
i(β, piz)Z(p
1
y, γ
i(β, p1z))
Differentiate zi with respect to β yields:
∂zi(.)
∂β
=
∂ηi(.)
∂β
Z(.) + ηi
∂Z(.)
∂γi
∂γi
∂β
=
p1zp
i1
z∗
(p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗)2
Z(.) +
βpi1z∗
p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗
∂Z(.)
∂γi
p1zp
i1
z∗(p
1
z − pi1z∗)
(p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗)2
=
γi(.)Z(.)
p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗
+
γi(.)
p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗
∂Z(.)
∂γi
βpi1z∗(p
1
z − pi1z∗)
p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗
p1z
p1z
=
γi(.)Z(.)
p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗
{
1 +
γi(.)
Z(.)
∂Z(.)
∂γi
β(p1z − pi1z∗)
p1z
}
=
γi(.)Z(.)
p1z(1− β) + βpi1z∗
(1− γiκ) > 0 if γi < 1
κ
Where κ =
β(p1z−pi1z∗ )
p1z
.
Hence, the tightening of the intermediate goods rules of origin, β increases the
originating intermediate goods demand for a country i given that γi <
1
κ
.
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Proof Proposition 3
For the homogeneous regime, or β < β∗B
The tightening of the intermediate goods rules of origin results in the following
results, given that γi <
1
κ
(i) ∂z
i(p1z ,β)
∂β
> 0 as shown in Lemma 5
(ii) ∂p
1
z
∂β
> 0
With implicit differentiation:
∂p1z
∂β
= −
[
∂z(.)/∂β
∂z(.)/∂p1z
]
Due to z(.) = η(.)Z(.) and Z =
p1z(1−β)+βp1z∗
p1z(1−β) z
∗, then:
∂z(.)
∂p1z
=
∂η(.)
∂p1z
Z + η(.)
∂Z(.)
∂p1z
According to Lemma 2, ∂η(.)
∂p1z
< 0, and ∂Z(.)
∂p1z
= − βp1z∗
p1z(1−β) < 0, so
∂z(.)
∂p1z
< 0. The
regional raw material is an increasing function of the level of β. That is ∂p
1
z
∂β
> 0.
(iii) ∂Z(.)
∂β
< 0
The strengthening of the intermediate goods rules of origin effects on the inter-
mediate goods demand can be written as:
∂Z(.)
∂β
=
∂Z(.)
∂p1z
∂p1z
∂β
As shown in (ii), ∂Z(.)
∂p1z
< 0 and ∂p
1
z
∂β
> 0, then ∂Z(.)
∂β
< 0. The raw material demand
158
decreases as the degree of restrictiveness of the intermediate goods rules of origin
increases.
(iv) ∂Sz(p
1
z)
∂β
> 0
The intermediate goods rules affect on the raw material supply as:
∂Sz(p
1
z)
∂β
=
∂S(.)
∂p1z
∂p1z
∂β
Due to ∂S(.)
∂p1z
> 0 and ∂p
1
z
∂β
> 0 as shown in (ii), then ∂Sz(p
1
z)
∂β
> 0. When the inter-
mediate goods rules of origin are tightened, the raw material supply increases.
Given (iii)-(iv), the tightening of the intermediate goods rules of origin de-
creases the raw material demand but increases the raw material supply. As a
result, the volume of raw material import from RoW drops.
For the heterogeneous regime, or β ≥ β∗B The tightening of the intermediate
goods rules of origin provides:
(v) ∂p˜z
∂β
< 0 as shown in Lemma 4
(vi) ∂Z(.)
∂β
> 0, when p1z = p˜z.
With Envelope theorem:
∂Z(.)
∂β
=
∂Z(.)
∂p1z
∂p1z
∂β
At p1z = p˜z,
∂Z(.)
∂p1z
∂p1z
<
0 and ∂p˜z
∂β
< 0 as shown in Lemma 4, then ∂Z(.)
∂β
> 0. An
increase in the degree of restrictiveness of the intermediate goods rules of origin
improves the raw material demand.
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(vii) ∂Sz(p˜z)
∂β
< 0
The tightening of the intermediate goods rules of origin impacts on the raw
material supply can be shown as:
∂Sz(p
1
z)
∂β
=
∂S(.)
∂p1z
∂p1z
∂β
At p1z = p˜z,
∂p˜z
∂β
< 0 as shown in (v), then ∂Sz(p˜z)
∂β
< 0. The more restrictive the
intermediate goods rules of origin, the more likely that the raw material supply
reduces.
Given (vi)-(vii), when the intermediate goods rules of origin are tightened in
the heterogeneous regime, the demand for the raw material increases whereas
the supply for the raw material decreases. Hence the volume of raw material
import from RoW improves.
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Conclusion
This thesis consists of three independent studies. These are (i) Quality Rep-
utation and Export Promotion, (ii) Why is it so difficult to settle a private
agreement in an antidumping case? and (iii) Do the Rules of Origin make a
difference? Here, the conclusions of each chapter and the entire thesis are ad-
dressed.
In Chapter 1: Quality Reputation and Export Promotion, provides answers
to questions concerning the relationship between the reputation and behaviour
of home firms in foreign markets. With a finite two-stage game model where
consumers in new foreign markets lack information about their own valuation
for the quality of a new product, three main findings emerge.
Firstly, with asymmetric information, the need to establish a quality repu-
tation is not sufficient to induce home firms to export a high-quality product
to foreign markets. Secondly, the likelihood of establishing a quality reputation
increases with the number of experienced consumers. In other word, home firms
is the least likely to establish their reputation in new markets. However, if the
probability that consumers assign a high valuation to a high-quality product
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is sufficient large, home firms will be the most likely to establish the quality
reputation of a product in new markets. And thirdly, the gains of establishing a
quality reputation falls with the number of competing firms in the case of new
markets but improves with the number of competing firms in the case of mature
markets.
If the model is extended to be longer and infinite, the behaviour of home
firms, especially in new markets, may be changed because consumers, whom
are deluded by a low-quality product at the beginning, have other opportunities
to learn their true type. Home firms may have either more or less incentive
to upgrade the quality of their product depending on many factors such as
the discount factor, the specification of market learning, the speed of consumer
learning.
According to the findings, the government can encourage home firms to ex-
port a high-quality product by increasing the payoff from doing that. Since
home firms are more likely to export a high-quality product to markets with
the larger number of experienced consumers. Therefore, the government should
introduce a new product to consumers in new markets in order to transform
inexperienced consumers into experienced ones. A free product trail is a simple
and straightforward tool but it will be effective only if a high-quality product is
provided as a sample to consumers.
The government may choose an export subsidisation to increase (decrease)
the gains (costs) of establishing a quality reputation in foreign markets. How-
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ever, a policy of subsidising exporters will efficiently support home firms to
choose high quality, promote consumer experience, and establish an indepen-
dently viable high-quality export market if, and only if, it is conditional on high
quality. Thus, the administrative monitoring of quality is required to ensure
that firms will not cheat by exporting a low-quality product as a high-quality
variant.
Since the gains of exporting a high-quality product decrease with the number
of competing firm in the case of new market. The government then should
limit firm entry, albeit temporarily. Once the quality reputation of a product is
established and consumers become experienced, the government should free the
entry of home firms. Competition is sufficient to induce reputable firms to keep
product quality high as well as convince new entrants to choose the choice of a
high-quality product for establishing a quality reputation.
The welfare implications of establishing a quality reputation is also provided.
The results show that establishing the quality reputation of a export product
will improve the welfare in the exporting country if, and only if, a fraction of
consumers whose tastes match well with their product is large enough. Hence,
establishing a quality reputation by quality upgrading may not be a desirable
choice for the exporting country. This contradicts to many studies which suggest
the production of a high-quality product is a pre-condition for export success
and, ultimately, the economic development.
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In Chapter 2: Why is it so difficult to settle a private agreement in an an-
tidumping case, this is motivated by an inconsistency between the theoretical
results and recent observations. Whereas many research papers argue that do-
mestic industries frequently employ the antidumping measure to threaten and
induce foreign industries to collude, recent observations show different results.
That is, only one-quarter of total antidumping cases result in price-undertaking
agreements. I employed a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with two-
sided asymmetric information, where the domestic and the foreign firm are un-
certain about the type of each other, to investigate the possibility of settling the
private agreement.
Results from this model show that the private agreement between the domes-
tic and foreign firm will be settled with certainty if, and only if, the domestic
firm applies a pooling strategy and the probability of a low-type foreign firm
is significant small. Otherwise, the private agreement will fail with a positive
probability. This contradicts Prusa (1999), whose model predicts that both do-
mestic and foreign firms always prefer to withdraw an antidumping petition and
reach a private agreement.
The likelihood of settling the private agreement increases with the probability
of a high-type foreign firm and the probability of a low-type domestic firm.
However, it deceases with the bargaining power and concentration level of the
domestic firm. This is inconsistent with Zanardi (2004), who claims that the
probability of collusion increases with the bargaining power and concentration
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level. It is also found that the domestic and foreign firm are more likely to
proceed with antidumping cases with two-sided asymmetric information than
one-sided asymmetric information or completed information. Hence, the small
number of price-undertaking agreements indicates the inefficiency of bargaining
game due to asymmetric information, not a decline in the use of the antidumping
measure as a collusive device.
In the view of the welfare analysis, the settlement outcome only improve
the profit of the petitioning domestic firm, not the social welfare. Therefore,
if the government aims to maximise the social welfare, it has to limit the use
of the antidumping measure as a collusive device rather than supporting it.
The antidumping laws are needed to harmonised to increase transparency of
the antidumping measure. Furthermore, the levying the antidumping duties on
products imported from the dumper’s country should be changed to a lum sum
payment. Since the latter does not distort the market and damage other related
industries but the former does.
In Chapter 3: Do the Rules of Origin make a difference, while the theoretical
studies and empirical works argue that the more restrictive rules of origin causes
a decreasing in preferential trade flows within the FTA region, the policy makers
have a different opinion. They consider the more restrictive rules of origin as
a device to induce firms to employ more regional upstream inputs and then
promote preferential trade and attract investments from outside. In order to
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provide the better understanding about the rules of origin impacts on preferential
trade and economic activities within the FTA region, I extend the model of
Ju and Krishna (2005) by allowing a production of intermediate goods and a
variation of origin requirement across products. In other words, the intermediate
goods and the final goods rules of origin are not necessarily the same. This model
is closer to the real situation and then is used to examine the behaviour of firms.
The findings show that the rules of origin impacts on preferential trade flows
and economic integration are ambiguous. They can either increase or decrease
trade flows within the FTA region depending on many factors. If the final goods
rules of origin effects dominate, a tightening of the rules of origin increases the
volume of final goods import from RoW but decreases the volume of intermediate
goods and raw material import from RoW for the homogeneous regime. Hence,
the rules of origin will positively affects on preferential trade flows and economic
integration when the impacts of the final goods sector are dominated.
These suggest that if a country aims to promote preferential trade flows and
economic activities within the FTA region, the tight final goods rules of origin
and the loose intermediate goods rules of origin will be required. In contrast, if
a country aims to limit preferential access and protect its final goods industry,
the tightening of the concerning goods rule of origin will not be sufficient. The
rules of origin of the upstream inputs have to be tightened to ensure the lower
preferential access from other the FTA members. Hence, rules of origin should
be the product-specific rules.
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Recently the critics have worried that a spaghetti-bowl of overlapping FTAs
might harm preferential trade by increasing transaction costs for manufacturers
through complicated rules of origin. The spaghetti-bowl issue has been raised
to discuss whether the preferential rules of origin should be harmonised. From
my point of view, a variation across preferential rules of origin regimes is more
preferable to harmonised rules of origin because the main purpose of rules of ori-
gin is to be a device to reach the country’s objectives in establishing the FTA,
which varies from agreement to agreement and from country to country. There
is no golden rule for rules of origin.
To conclude, this thesis focuses on three interesting topics of international
trade policy. These are (i) the reputation effect on quality upgrading (ii) misuse
of antidumping measure and (iii) misunderstanding of rules of origin. It is
found that a free market does not guarantee a desirable outcome for society
nor individuals. Hence, to reach the objectives of a country, the government
interference is needed. The government has to provide an optimal policy to
induce individuals to behave optimally.
However, the government policies may not be effective as the government
aims if they are not implemented at the right time and situation. For example,
a policy of free entry will be appropriate to induce firms to export a high-
quality product rather than a low-quality variant, if firms enter into mature
markets. On the contrary, if this policy is used when firms enter into new
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market, it cannot induce firms to upgrade the quality of their export product
as the government intends. Similarly, The tight rules of origin do not guarantee
an increasing in preferential trade flows and economic activities within the FTA
region. If the government tightens up both final and intermediate goods rules
of origin, preferential trade flows may fall rather than rise as expected. To
promote preferential trade flows and economic activities within the FTA region,
the government needs to negotiate for the tight final goods rules of origin and
the loose intermediate goods rules of origin.
Frequently, the government faces a conflict between consumers and firms. For
instance, consumers in the home country are likely to be harmed by collusion due
to settling the private agreement in an antidumping case, while domestic firms
can benefit from that. The government has to decide whether to allow domestic
and foreign firms to settle the private agreement. Beside a conflict between
consumers and firms, a conflict between the different groups of industries is
always happened. For example, producers of final goods always require the
loose final goods rules of origin due to a lower cost of complying with rules
of origin, whereas producers of intermediate goods prefer the tight final goods
rules of origin because of the more regional intermediate goods being required.
The government has to choose to favour either a final goods industry or an
intermediate goods industry. Hence, it is necessary for the government to set
country’s objectives clearly before making a policy.
A clear and correct understanding of issues is a key element of a policy
170
success. The government cannot develop a right policy and achieve its objectives,
if it does not really understand the problems and situations. This thesis provides
the theoretical studies and a policy discussion on (i) the reputation impacts
on firms’quality choices, (ii) the effects of antidumping measures on collusion
between domestic and foreign firms, and (iii) the impacts of rules of origin on
firms’ behaviour and preferential trade flows respectively. These will be a useful
reference and guideline for policy makers, government officers, trade negotiators
or even politicians when deal with the international trade policy related to these
three issues.
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